SSHRC Partnership: Conjugal Slavery in Wartime

Masculinities and Femininities Thematic Group

Annotated Bibliography on Militarization of East Africa

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Table of Contents

Statistics and Military Expenditure ................................................................................ 7

World Bank. “Expenditure on education as % of total government expenditure (%).” 1999-2012. .......................................................... 7
World Health Organization. “Uganda.” .................................................................. 7
- Total expenditure on health as % if GDP (2014): 7.2% ........................................ 7
UN Data. “Country Profile: Uganda.” .................................................................. 7
N/A. “Arms and the African.” The Economist. 22 November 2014. ......................... 9
Olingo, Allan. “East Africa: Nairobi, Juba Lead Region in Military Expenditure.” All Africa 7 May 2016 ................................................................. 12

Political Economy of the Military ................................................................................ 12
Kagoro, Jude and Sarah Bieker. “For whom do the police work?: The Ugandan police between militarization and everyday duties.” Institute for Intercultural and International Studies. Date N/A ................................................................. 16

Recruitment ..................................................................................................................... 22
Kasasira, Ridel. “Want to join the army? Here is how it’s done.” *The Daily Monitor* October 31, 2013. .................................................................................................................. 22
Caleb, Opio Sam. “Uganda: 22-Year Army Recruit Dies During Drills in Kamuri.” *All Africa* October 18, 2016. ........................................................................................................ 23

Life in the Military/Military Codes of Conduct .................................................................... 25
“UPDF Code of Conduct.” Uganda Facts........................................................................... 32
Kasasira, Ridel. “Uganda: UPDF Colonel Arrested Over Rebel Activities.” *All Africa* 13 June 2016. .......................................................................................................... 38
N/A. “Frequently Asked Questions.” *AMISOM* ................................................................ 39
N/A. “AU Recognizes Uganda’s Special Role in Pacifying Somalia.” *African Defense* 1 August 2016. .............................................................................................................. 39
Suckling, Chris and Jordan Anderson. “Ugandan withdrawal from AMISOM unlikely but capability of Al-Shabaab improving amid poor co-operation between Ethiopia and Kenya.” Janes 19 May 2016 .............................................................................................................. 40
Oknor, Samuel. “Mission (Not) Accomplished.” IRIN News 1 July 2016 .......................................................................................... 41

Uganda as Military Force in the Region ........................................................................................................................................ 43
Dak, James Gatdet. “Ugandan army implicated in southern Sudan atrocities – official report.” Sudan Tribune 4 July 2008 ........................................................................................................................................ 47
Oluoch, Fred. “East Africa: Uganda to Host Military Intelligence Base to Monitor Eastern DR Congo.” All Africa 10 January 2017 ........................................................................................................................................ 50

African Union .................................................................................................................................................. 51
Human Rights Watch. “Somalia: Sexual Abuse by African Union Soldiers.” 8 September 2014 ........................................................................................................................................ 52
N/A. “Uganda Wants AMISOM Funding Reviewed.” All Africa 6 February 2017 ........................................................................................................................................ 53


New Militaries (East African Standby Force) 


Africa Command 


Jonathan Fisher .................................................. 76


Adam Branch .................................................. 81


Ledio Cakaj .................................................. 85

Statistics and Military Expenditure

- Has dropped since 1988 from 3.8% to 1.2%

- Declining 2001 to 2012, dropping from 2001 to 2009 from 2.4 to 1.8
- Spiking in 2010, then dropping again back down to 1.3 in 2012

- 
- Has increased from 1.4% to 1.8% from 1995 to 2014

World Health Organization. “Uganda.”
- Total expenditure on health as % if GDP (2014): 7.2%

- Rate of 9.5 in 2011 which is in high human development index for expenditure on health

UN Data. “Country Profile: Uganda.”
- 2014 spending health as percent of GDP 7.2%
- 2014 spending on education as percent of GDP 2.2%

- Ranked as 91 of 126
- Manpower of 14,300,000; fit for service 8,515,000; active frontline personnel 45,000; active reserve personnel 2,000


Abstract: This news article discusses East African military spending. The article notes that in 2013, Uganda and Burundi spent the most on their militaries compared to other East African countries, with Tanzania spending the least. Uganda defence spending has risen as the region has tried to collectively cut spending in the period of the last two decades.
- For the year 2013 Uganda and Burundi led in East African military spending, Uganda spending 2.2% of GDP
- Uganda has been rising as rest of region has been making attempts to cut back in defense spending


Abstract: This report is the result of a study carried out by Wuyi Omitoogun, Research Associate on the SIPRI Military Expenditure Project, between 1999 and 2001. It examines the quality and the availability of data on military expenditure in a selected group of African states. The main reason for carrying out the study was to determine the reasons for the scarcity of African military expenditure data in the SIPRI database in particular and in the major international sources generally. Interest in African military expenditure grew in the 1990s and the increased demand for reliable information was evidenced by the number of requests SIPRI received from various sources—donors, researchers, students and civil society organizations interested in Africa. The problems which SIPRI, and indeed others, faced in meeting this demand made the present study a necessity.

- International donors played big role, “as Uganda made progress, the donors reviewed their programmes of support and increased support to match various landmark achievements of the new government” page 97
- “Since Uganda needed all the support it could get in the early stages of the new administration’s life, it adapted its national development programme to suit the demands of the donors” page 97
- through the 70s lost their good civil structure and with it statistics publications
- with Museveni take over in mid 80s statistics and began to reappear, including military
- but…seemed to be for donors not public, “Again, it would appear that in the early period (1985-93) the data was published more as part of the effort to satisfy the donors, who insisted on their regular compilation and publication, than as part of an effort to inform the general public” page 99
- “The question how reliable the official military expenditure data of Uganda are should be viewed within the context of the country’s political economy. Uganda is torn between the need to satisfy the donors, who contribute substantial parts of its government expenditure, and the need to provide for its security with resources it deems adequate. After the donors helped to fund the demobilization of a considerable proportion of the armed forces between 1992 and 1996, as mentioned above, they stipulated that military expenditure should not exceed 2 per cent of GDP annually” page 102
- Uganda says this is not realistic, they feel 2 per cent does not allow for adequate security
- “…it is believed that in one way or another it has been getting its way in any case, as it used its powers over the implementation of the budget to initiate discretionary spending which usually favoured defence. Many saw this request to donors as merely an attempt to allow what was already being done discreetly to be done openly and officially” page 103
- “The Auditor-General of Uganda in his 2001 annual report to Parliament reported that nearly 8 billion shillings (almost equivalent of the budgeted development expenditure for
2000/2001, and more than the 1999/2000 development expenditure for defence) had been transferred to the Ugandan people’s Defence Forces (UPDF) from the ministry of Internal Affairs and Police Headquarters to cater for various operations and salaries of units of the UPDF. This was in addition to other unauthorized expenditures that were pointed out in the report to Parliament, amounting to over 3 billion shillings. This confirms the use of resources from other sectors to fund the military.” Page 103

- to avoid the eyes of donors who capped security expenditure at 2 per cent trends military expenditures has steady risen peaked in 2002 as share of GDP has declined (due to donor cap)


Abstract: This article discusses the increase in military spending across Africa, looking at specific examples of increased spending across the continent. The article examines how much some countries are spending, what they are buying, and the increase in African Union peacekeeping missions. The article also discusses how African armies are becoming more professional. The article also recognizes that some of this increase in spending is due to the increase in security threats, mostly from jihadist movements, piracy, oil and gas discovery, and also rebel and militia groups.


Abstract: In this article, a times-series analysis of Uganda from 1983 to 2004 is conducted using the Ordinary Least Squares method to investigate the defense-growth nexus in sub-Saharan Africa. The study is the rst to use disaggregated military data, expanding previous literature by analyzing the compositional effect of military expenditure on growth. The results indicate a significantly negative relation- ship with growth exists for both aggregate and recurrent military expenditure. Surprisingly, a positive (albeit insignificant) relationship exists between capital military expenditure and growth. The findings from Uganda suggest a negative defense-growth relationship in sub-Saharan Africa and that the composition of defense spending ultimately deter- mines the net economic effect on growth.

- “Shortly after the demobilization and ceiling imposition, insurgencies associated with the Lord’s Resistance Army began to rise in the northern portion of Uganda, resulting in a slight increase of defense spending” page 40

- “Multiple methods exist for manipulating the level of military data. Certain defense purchases can be removed from the central budget balance sheet, such as purchasing arms using export earnings from a state enterprise without repatriating the funds. Other times it is a blatant reclassification of expenditure in hopes that it will not be examined” page 40

Abstract: This article empirically explores the relationship between military expenditure, external debts and economic performance in the economies of sub-Saharan Africa using a sample of 25 countries from 1988–2007. In investigating the defence–external debt nexus, we employ three advanced panel techniques of fully modified OLS (FMOLS), Dynamic OLS (DOLS) and dynamic fixed effect (DFE) to estimate our model. We observe that military expenditure has a positive and significant impact on external debt in African countries. Real GDP affects the total debt stock of African countries with a negative relationship. Our empirical results based on long-run elasticities show that a 1% rise in national output leads to a decline in external debt by 1.52%, on average. Policy-wise, the study suggests that African countries need to strengthen areas of fiscal responsibility and pursue models that encourage rational spending, particularly reductions in military expenditure.

- No good notes??
itself up to accusations of double standards and hypocrisy. Corruption in arms procurement in SSA represents a small segment of a complex global pipeline that links Western arms firms and licensing governments to corrupt foreign officials and offshore financial institutions; tackling this web of corruption requires major reforms at the level of global governance, not just in governance procedures in SSA. With an analysis limited by inappropriate neoliberal methodologies and tainted by the alleged corrupt practices of British arms firms operating within SSA, DFID has been forced to put its TIDE initiative on the back burner.

- “The case of Uganda is illustrative of the inability of the state to provide basic security under donor terms of conditionality, which forced it to fund military campaigns with off-budgets sources of income. In the 1990s, Museveni’s government, facing the costly task of attempting to contain the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), was unable to realistically bring its military budget to below 2 per cent of GDP, given the manpower, logistical and arms expenditure needs required to conduct a campaign on its northern border.” Page 340

- “Faced with these intractable demands Museveni implemented several creative accounting techniques to enable him to allocate sufficient resources to his military campaign, while allowing him to keep official military expenditures below the 2 per cent benchmark. Resources earmarked for other government departments were diverted to the ministry of Defence. In 2001 Museveni openly asked the donors to lift the 2 per cent ceiling, and requested permission to spend twice what the government had officially allocated to the military in 2000. In effect, the request was merely an attempt to gain permission to officially spent what was already being allocated to the military. Reluctantly, and in the face of international pressure to find some kind of solution to the human rights violations perpetuated by the LRA, the donors agreed. Since then, there has been a steady rise in official military expenditures.” Page 340-341

- “The redistribution of existing assents to the benefit of the armed forces that may involve the reallocation of resources from other budgetary headings or state revenues. Examples include the Ugandan Government’s initial allocation of resources to the police budget, later redirected to the military, to augment the costs of the campaign against the Lord’s Resistance Army in the North of Uganda” page 342

- “Volunteering soldiers for UN or African Union peacekeeping operations (PKOs) is another means of generating extra funds. Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe are among those countries that have volunteered for PKOs. Rarely do UN payments for these forces appear in annual military budgets.” Page 343


Abstract: This study investigates whether ethnic and other forms of social diversity affect militarization of society. Recent scholarship in economics finds that high diversity leads to lower provision of public goods. At the same time, many conflict studies find that highly diverse societies face a lower risk of civil war, as opposed to relatively more homogenous populations. The authors explore whether diversity prompts governments to militarize heavily in order to prevent armed conflict, which would then crowd out spending on other public goods in a ‘guns versus butter’ trade-off. Thus, ‘preventive militarization’ would explain both outcomes. Yet the
authors find the opposite: higher levels of ethnic diversity predict lower levels of militarization. If high diversity lowers the hazard of civil war, as many find, then it does not happen via preventive militarization. If diverse societies spend less on public goods, then this is not because they are crowded out by security spending. The results support those who suggest that diversity may, in fact, pose a lower security threat to states, since it is highly likely that states facing potential social strife would prioritize state militarization.

- No good notes??


Abstract: This news article discusses how Kenya was named the best military in East Africa and ranked as 11th most powerful military in Africa. This comes after their invasion of Somalia, which at the beginning was seen as a “blunder”, but now the sentiment is that Kenyan troops have proved themselves.

- Kenyan defense forces have become one of the most respected militaries in Africa
- Ranked 11th most powerful military in Africa
- Museveni has been said to question Kenyan capacities and called them “career army” unable to fight Al-Shabaab

Olingo, Allan. “East Africa: Nairobi, Juba Lead Region in Military Expenditure.” *All Africa* 7 May 2016.

Abstract: This article discusses East African military expenditure trends. Specific to Uganda, the article notes how it is the only country to drop in military expenditure, and to be unclear in where its arms were coming from or what arms it was purchasing. It also examined in detail spending’s of Rwanda, Tanzania and Kenya, among other East African countries.

- South Sudan and Kenya are East Africa’s mtop spenders on military equipment
- Uganda dropped in military spending – 326 million in 2014 to 288 million last year
- More money being put towards further professionalizing the armed forces of Uganda

Political Economy of the Military


Abstract: This paper draws on the notion of “coercive power” as developed by Levitsky and Way (Competitive authoritarianism: hybrid regimes after the cold war, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010) to argue that the incumbent regime in Uganda, the National Resistance Movement under President Yoweri Museveni, offers a particularly interesting case of competitive authoritarianism. Using empirical data, the paper extends Levitsky and Way’s scope of analysis to include contem- porary Uganda, which has vital characteristics of both
democracy and authoritarianism. The paper provides a fresh insight into the hitherto lesser-analyzed “trinitarian” interplay whereby President Museveni, the military and the ruling party essentially function as one and the same. The paper singles out the incumbent regime’s coercive capacity as the most instrumental factor that explains its continued stability. Subsequently, the paper elucidates the symbiotic coercive strategies that are applied to systematically resist opposition challenges.

- “While seizing power in 1986, Museveni largely utilized the military wing as the guarantor of his power and political order. In fact, some scholars have argued that the NRM’s shallow political base was the reason behind the banning of multiparty politics between 1986 and 2005.” Page 161
- “However, the NRM could not openly present the military wing as a senior partner of the political wing. To gain international legitimacy and to some extent legitimize its position domestically, the NRM government chose to put forward civil political structures that concealed the power of the military and paramilitary structures. In what Rubongoya calls the modus vivendi of a police state, the civil political structures were circumvented and undermined by parallel military and paramilitary structures from the lowest unit of state administration, Local Council I (LCI), to the central government.” Page 161
- “The majority of the interviewees drawn from local administration structures acknowledged that although the central government has ceded some powers to their units through decentralization, it still exerts considerable influence when the political stakes are high, such as during general elections.” Page 161
- “All aforementioned security structures are obliged to serve the interests of the president and the NRM party in general, consequently strengthening the Trinitarian interplay.” Page 162
- “Although the armed wing of the NRM, the National Resistance Army (NRA), was nationalized and renamed the Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) after the promulgation of the 1995 constitution, the army and the party are inextricably connected. For a start, political leaders including President Museveni doubled as military field commanders during the struggle for power, and the military wing was considered superior to the political wing. The military has continued to play a central role and appears to be a core constituency of the NRM government. Moreover, President Museveni doubled as Minister of Defense for 15 years (1986-2001) and remained a serving soldier for 18 years (1986-2004) of his presidency. And although President Museveni relinquished his position as Minister of Defense in 2001 and “retired” from the army in 2004, he remains a de facto serving member of the army.” Page 164-165
- “First, the 1995 Uganda constitution allows the military to elect ten serving officers to represent the military constituency in the national legislative assembly” page 165
- “Second, several senior military officers, including President Museveni, have on several occasions made public declarations to the effect that the military cannot allow the opposition to take power” page 165
  - “In the run up to the 1996 presidential elections, Major General Kahinda Otafire, then Minister of State for Security, publically asserted that if anyone except Museveni won the presidential elections, the newcomer would be overthrown within 24 h” page 165
“In the 2001 elections, Brigadier Henry Tumukunde reminded voters that, irrespective of whom they vote for, President Museveni would still rule because they (the NRM) had guns” page 165

“In September 2008, General Aronda Nyakairima, then Chief of Defense Forces, explicitly declared, “We [the military] liberated this country in 1986 and we shall not allow bad characters to come back to power, we will fight all these forces [the opposition]” page 165

In January 2013, President Museveni, Minister of Defense Crispus Kiyonga, and Chief of Defense Forces General Aronda Nyakairima each made a bold pronouncement that the army could intervene (carry out a coup) if the country’s parliament continued to challenge the powers of the executive” page 165

- “Third, in all four presidential elections since 1996, the military has been explicitly involved in electoral malpractice and misconduct such as openly campaigning for President Museveni, harassment of the opposition, manning of polling stations, staffing ballot boxes, and directing people how to vote “wisely”. “Page 165

- “In the 2001 elections, for example, the military was involved in electoral violence ranging from firing live ammunition at opposition supporters and deliberately crashing vehicles into anti-NRM crowds to defacing opposition candidate Kizza Besigye’s campaign posters. In the 2006 election, Lieutenant Ramathan Magala shot live ammunition into a crowd of Besigye’s supporters at Bulange Mengo in Kampala, killing two and injuring others” page 166

- “Every general election including the most recent in 2011 has seen heavy military deployment on a regular basis, especially in the capital Kampala. Political analysts believe that the heavy military presence during elections is a symbolic display signaling what awaits those who intend to vote or demonstrate against the NRM.” Page 166

- “Empirical evidence suggests that Museveni’s position vis-à-vis the military is unassailable and his stature over it seen as natural. This dimension has enabled him to retain the effectiveness of his coercive capacity. One should keep in mind that the NRM and the military that form the core of the incumbent regime were personally nurtured by President Museveni from the early 1970s to the emergence of the NRM party as a major political force in Uganda. Museveni’s extensive authority is augmented by additional wide-ranging powers derived from the constitution. He is the commander-in-chief as well as chairman of most of the organs of the national security system, which includes the National Security Council, the Military High Command and the Defense Forces Council. A senior military officer indicated that these historical and contemporary realities have made it possible for President Museveni to enjoy overarching influence over the army for political ends.” Page 167-68

- “Some observers have implied that the army displays unflagging loyalty to President Museveni, who has personalized control over it.” P 168

- “The president has maintained a strong grip on the military by appointing and promoting loyal cadres to top positions while purging the disloyal and the fence-sitters.” P 168

- “…A shared ethnic identity is a critical factor in maintaining the highest levels of cohesion. Similarly, the military’s personal loyalty to President Museveni has been consolidated by the shared ethnic background of the top echelon of the army.” P 168

- “The president has also appointed his inner family members to sensitive positions in the military. His younger brother, General Salim Saleg, served as the first army commander
when Museveni assumed power in 1986 and is currently the senior advisor on military affairs.” P. 168
- “In February 2010, the Presidential Guard Brigade (PGB), which was considered to have been the most lethal with the largest formation, most immense fire-power, best-trained and best-paid force in the country was fused into the previously smaller Special Forces and placed under the command of President Museveni’s son, Brigadier Muhoozi Kainerugaba.” Page 168-69


Abstract: This paper argues that military ethos play a central role in the politics of post-1986 Uganda. This phenomenon is a product of the intersection between the country’s sociopolitical history and the discourse that brought the incumbent ruling party, the National Resistance Movement, to power. Both the ruling party and the leading opposition party, the Forum for Democratic Change — an off-shoot of the former — have strong military orientation. To resonate with the populace’s shared perceptions that attach a high symbolic capital to the military ethos, the two dominant parties use military branding as one of their vital strategies. In deconstructing the centrality of military ethos in politics, the paper draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s thinking tools of “habitus”, “field of power” and “symbolic capital”.

- “The majority of the interviewees, focus group discussions and accounts gathered from the newspapers suggest that there is a strongly held perception associating the military with political power. This reinforces the myth that one cannot be president without a military power-base.” Page 34
- “A common theme emerges from the above views: military credentials are important for one to have a better chance of becoming head of state…One can therefore argue that for strategic and practice reasons, an average Ugandan is predisposed to thinking that a military persona as president would guarantee political certainty and security. For many people the assumption is that if a civilian is elected president, the military will overthrow him or her and this is likely to drive Uganda back to political chaos.” Page 35
- “Museveni’s symbolic capital has been accumulated through presenting himself as a smart military strategist.” Page 35
- “First, in April 2009, the ruling NRM party MPs on the vetting committee gave President Museveni a seven day ultimatum to explain the “illegal” re-appointment of the Inspector General of Government (IGG). Museveni rebuked the MPs, told them to shut-up and reminded Ugandans that a military general like himself cannot be given an ultimatum.” Page 37
- “A senior military officer makes a broader observation that the beginning point of any Ugandan military strategy including the president’s security detail reflects Museveni’s personal fascination with the military. The officer adds that the military is part of Museveni’s persona and a strong point of reference for his political credentials” page 38
- “A number of incidences can be used to confirm that President Museveni’s wearing of military uniform is indeed a strategy for symbolic capital accumulation. For instance, an NRM election mobilizer recalls that in both the 1996 and 2001 presidential campaigns –
especially in the former – President Museveni worth the uniform at some campaign rallies and during exclusive meetings with the campaign teams.” Page 39

Kagoro, Jude and Sarah Bieker. “For whom do the police work?: The Ugandan police between militarization and everyday duties.” Institute for Intercultural and International Studies. Date N/A.

Abstract: Since late 1990s, the incumbent regime in Uganda, the National Resistance Movement, seems to have embraced patterns of militarization in the civil police. Contrary to the conventional security paradigm that vouches for a clear distinction between the police and military, in Uganda the police seem to be highly militarized. At least three dimensions illustrate this phenomenon. First, the government has deployed military personnel in the police and appointed military generals to head it. Second, the police have adopted military models, e.g. the shoot-to-kill operations and violence-centric means of problem solving. Third, there are indicators, which suggest that the police are involved in political policing. On the flip side however, empirical evidence also suggests that policing in Uganda is demanded by the public and fulfilled by the police—even when they complain about the militarization of the force. Citizens in Uganda go to police stations, appreciate police service and are even willing to construct official stations using their private funds. On a day-to-day basis the police settle conflicts, take statements, patrol the streets, organize the traffic and produce paperwork. The paper therefore draws a detailed picture from inside the police since it is based on extensive fieldwork in Uganda, carried out between 2009 and 2014. The paper concludes that the close ideological and functional bond between the police and the military is largely connected to rivalry for political power at the macro level. On an everyday basis however, it seems that the same police do ‘just normal police work’.

- “In fact, it is not only the military that is getting more involved in domestic threats, but the police is also getting more involved in external threats, Alice Hills argues that separating the roles of police and military is particularly more difficult in Africa because the police forces are politicized and have a tradition of paramilitarism.” Page 3

- “Based on political considerations President Museveni had to work on molding a police force that reads from the same political page as his constituency in the army, a senior military officer and a police officer separately observe. The vote of no-confidence that the police was extending to Museveni and NRM was giving the opposition a psychological boost; a trend that had to be reversed.” Page 4

- “First, the president prepared the general public to resonate with the militarization of the police scheme. In part, public consent was constructed when the NRM government continuously condemned the police for its inefficiency, incompetence, corruption and failure to fight crime. The government continued to underfund the police which made it even more difficult for the force to improve its efficiency and to win public sympathy.” Page 4

- “Following General Katumba’s appointment police management issues at all levels were addressed and the discipline of the forces was greatly improved. To give Katumba’s appointment credence the government immediately increased police funding, which in turn enabled the force to realize some rapid positive changes that enhanced its public image.” Page 5-6
- "The crisscrossing deployment of Gen. Katumba Wamala from the military to police and back to the military demonstrates how increasingly fused the police and the military have become." P. 6

- "Several interviewees expressed that after becoming the police chief, Gen. Kayihura embarked on the political orientation of the police force to reduce the ideological distance that existed between it and the NRM." P. 6

- "The deployment of military officers – including Generals as IGP – in the police has to some extent inserted a military mind-set and subculture in the force. Besides, interviews with some police officers revealed that the force has rigorously recruited fresh university graduates who are taken for both intensive military training, and police training. Asked about the difference between police and military training, interviewed officers were generally of the view that whereas police training should be more concerned with handling crime, how to use evidence and conduct investigations, the current police training in Uganda includes battle drills and handling of lethal weapons, which should be a reserve of the military." P. 7

- "A senior military officer offers that the work ethics of the police are more military than police; "the force is organized among military structures and displays more military-like characteristics in its operations as opposed to a prototype civil police force". The officer adds that the police force is now more centralized and equipped with more lethal weapons such as AK47s, light infantry weapons and others with stronger suppression capabilities. An academician at Makerere University offers that “the police force is actually becoming more military than the military itself”." P. 8

- "Moreover, in August 2013, the Ugandan Parliament passed the Public Order Management Bill – later signed into law by President Museveni in September 2013 – despite broad criticism by opposition politicians, religious leaders, domestic and international civil society organizations. The Act gives police discretionary authority to veto gatherings of as few as three people in a public arena to deliberate political issues – the force can also break up a gathering of three or more people discussing issues in their homes. To organize a public meeting, police must receive written notice seven days in advance." P. 8-9

- "Stanley may have used cases of applying military tactics in police duties and the thin-line dividing "enemies" and opposition supporters, to make an argument that the state has structured a security architecture that is oriented to protecting regime power rather than provision of security as a public good. Not surprising, the police in Uganda have been consistently named as the leading human rights abusers in the country, in particular responsible for incommunicado detention as illegal detention centers; operatives using cars without number plates; operatives carrying out arrests while in civilian clothes and with no identifying insignia; not informing suspects of the reasons they were being arrested; routine torture and coercing suspects into confessions of crimes against the state.” P. 10


Abstract: As African countries moved toward electoral democratization in the 1990s, many countries remained basically authoritarian, but incorporated some democratic innovations to one
degree or another. Thus, the rules for authoritarian regimes changed in fundamental ways so that
such regimes differed markedly from the autocracies of the earlier post-independence period.
Post-1986 Uganda is used in this paper to show how authoritarianism has softened under Yoweri
Museveni when compared with the earlier regimes of Idi Amin and Milton Obote. However, as
we also see in the Ugandan case, most rulers have only gone as far with political reforms as they
have felt they had needed to in order to satisfy domestic and donor pressures. Enormous
constraints on civil and political liberties persist. The article examines the nature of semi-
authoritarian regimes using the case of Uganda.

- No good notes??


Abstract: In the 1970s and 1980s, Africa was the most militarised and conflict-torn continent in
the world. Civil wars, military coups, armed foreign interventions, ethnic conflicts, and other
forms of civil and political strife were commonplace. At the height of these conflicts one-quarter
to onethird of Africa’s population were displaced and became refugees. In the 1970s, military
budgets and arms procurements in Africa grew at a faster rate than in any other world region,
before receding in the 1980s under the impact of deepening economic recession. While these
trends have not disappeared altogether, Africa has witnessed a no less dramatic demilitarisation
and democratisation of its politics since the late eighties and early nineties. Peace accords and
elections have led to the end of civil wars in Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia and
Eritrea. Military governments have been removed in Mali, the Central African Republic, Benin,
the Congo, Ghana, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and, until recently, Niger and Burundi.

Authoritarian and one-party governments in the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Gabon, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Tunisia, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania and elsewhere have submitted themselves to
elections and otherwise liberalised their regimes.

- “Militarization has reflected a daunting kaleidoscope of problems in Africa: economic
  mismanagement and decline, weak national integration, ethnic and class conflict, weak
  political institutionalization, lack of political accountability, corruption, abuse of human
  rights and so on.” P. 7
- “Uganda has inserted a clause in its new constitution to the effect that anyone illegally
  overthrowing a constitutional government should and will be punished, no matter how far
  down the road.” P. 15

Eleazu, Uma O. “The Role of the Army in African Politics: A Reconsideration of Existing

Abstract: Among the many problems that face African nations, the worst consists of the
unrecognized, often disguised consequences (intended and unin- tended) of the policies of
foreign powers toward them. Nowhere is this problem more obvious than in the area of military
assistance programs and their effects on civilian-military relations. Without such programs, it is
likely that African nations would still have manifested political instability (which is to be
expected in societies undergoing rapid economic and social change), but unlikely that such
instability would have prevented normal political development from arising out of trial and error with different modes of conflict resolution. The efforts of the big powers, especially the United States and her Western allies, to try to hasten development "in the direction of freedom rather than tyranny" has, in contrast, been largely counterproductive.' Not only are many African countries farther away from freedom (even in the Western sense), but the feeling is developing in some African quarters that perhaps Western policies are intended to produce just that kind of political situation, dominated by a particular type of elite, that will enhance the maximization of neocolonial interests in Africa irrespective of the interests and aspirations of common African people.

- No good notes


Abstract: There are various reasons why President Museveni is so determined to hold on to power in Uganda. These are similar to the ones motivating other African presidents seeking to entrench themselves in office. Museveni believes he is indispensable for Uganda’s stability and prosperity, especially in a country devastated by bad leadership in earlier post-independence decades. Moreover, Museveni and his close allies are fearful of being prosecuted under a new president for alleged wrongdoings. Opposition to Museveni’s continued stay in power has come from within the ruling party, as well as other parties and the Buganda kingdom. But, as elsewhere in Africa, the opposition is too weakly developed to challenge Museveni effectively. Also, presidential manipulations, election rigging, and coercive measures have helped to secure Museveni’s grip on power. In particular, Museveni has used the military to entrench himself in office. Moreover, as in some African countries, international pressures to force Museveni to relinquish power are limited. In fact, donors have propped up a quasi-authoritarian regime with large amounts of resources. Museveni has overseen a prolonged period of economic and political stability and donors argue he deserves their support, even when his record on democracy and good governance is tainted. In Africa, presidential incumbents who have stepped down have done so because of the strength of domestic and international pressures. Where political opposition is organised and united or where international donors use their aid to promote greater democratisation, then leaders are more likely to abandon plans to stay in power. It is the absence of such conditions.

- “In 2006 top political leaders were alleged to have phoned and threatened the judges that if the election results were annulled there would be a military takeover to maintain Museveni in power.” Page 35
- “It is evident that the UPDF might not stay out of partisan politics as constitutionally required but would intervene to ensure Museveni remains in power.” P 44
- “The military and security services have been the bedrock of Museveni’s power. He has been constantly telling Ugandans that he controls the army, that it is his army, and that it would never accept someone like Dr Besigye as president and commander-in-chief. The UPDF has been run as a de facto personal army of President Museveni to help him hang on to power. Army appointments and promotions are made solely by Museveni.” P 44
- “The 12,000-strong PGB comprises the best-trained, best-equipped and best-paid military force in Uganda. It constitutes the president’s personalized military machine. Museveni wields strong control over its decision-making structures; his eldest son, Lieutenant Colon Muhoozi Kainerugaba, is a commander of special forces in the PGB. Museveni also keeps it and the UPDF deeply divided so that they are insufficiently coherent to confront him or overthrow him.” P 44
- “There are many army officers who are currently on ‘katebe’ undeployed. This has been an established method in the UPDF of ‘punishing officers who have fallen out of favour’ with the president. It is commonly the result of criticizing the leadership style of the commander-in-chief.” P. 44
- “Military coups have occurred in several African countries in the past year and Uganda’s political leadership will be watching for evidence of any signs of unrest in the senior ranks of the army. Thus when an undeployed former army commander, Major-General James Kazini, publicly accused the army leadership of various sins including keeping officers for long periods without deployment, his speech had the potential to spark unrest in the army. Museveni quickly directed that he be tried by a military court martial. Kazini was subsequently convicted of creating ghost soldiers and sentenced to three years imprisonment.” P. 44-5


Abstract: The paper examines cases of corrupt military procurement in Uganda since the late 1990s. It also considers the illicit business activities of Ugandan army officers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 1998. The paper then discusses how military corruption aroused the concern of parliament, and became a matter of importance in the 2001 presidential elections. We argue that the prevalence of military corruption was the result of government and army leaders not being subject to public accountability. Not a single leader has been faced with prosecution or punishment for corrupt military behaviour. has been faced with prosecution or punishment for corrupt military behaviour. We conclude by arguing that military corruption has helped to maintain the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in power, although this has been realised at the cost of building a professional national army in Uganda. at the cost of building a professional national army in Uganda.

- “Serious cases of military corruption occurred in Uganda in the late 1990s. These were prevalent predominantly in the procurement of defense equipment and army supplies but occurred also where the UPDF was deployed in war situations. Most of those involved in diverse corrupt military behavior were army officers, but senior defense ministry officials and civilian business people also participated. Many of these military and political figures were closely connected – at times related – to President Museveni and his wife. And, indeed, it was President Museveni who was responsible for permitting an environment to emerge conducive to much military corruption by a handful of his relatives and supporters.” P 546
- “Besiyge directed many of his attacks towards government and military corruption…He attacked President Museveni in particular for failing to curb rampant corruption among army officers. ‘The real problem is lack of political will to fight corruption at the highest
level of government’, he said, and cited the example of the President forgiving his brother after Salim Saleh confessed to being offered a commission in the helicopter deal.” p. 549


Abstract: Uganda suffered coups between 1966 and 1985, but has remained stable since 1986 despite predisposition to previous coups. Ethnic antagonism, weak state institutionalization, and past coups, had made Uganda coup-prone. Compared to previous governments, the post-1986 leadership effectively applied and undertook coup-prevention strategies consistent with James Quinlivan’s coup-proofing theory. These include establishing a parallel military structure to the mainstream military; formation of security services with parallel reporting channels, monitoring over society, and other security agencies; and co-optation of the military in politics through parliamentary representation. These measures have helped the regime to watch over security agencies and prevent possible military intervention. Uganda’s post-1986 regime stability is interesting in its own right. But it provides evidence consistent with, and useful for testing the efficacy of, Quinlivan’s coup-proofing theory: with relevant application and domestication the theory applies to Uganda.

- “The expansion of the President’s security detail from a Protection Unit to a Brigade means more than creation of a fully fledged parallel military force with limited ethnosecurity composition.” P. 542
- “Second, PGB’s training and facilitation take place concurrently with professionalization of the UPDF, leading to a military establishment that guarantees career service to serving officers; it might cause discontent if the regime trained and equipped PGB only… By professionalizing the UPDF and ensuring effective regime security, it is not easy to plot a coup, let alone implement it.” P. 543
- “Another technique involves direct participation in politics. Here, constitutionally, and according to the UPDF Act, 2005, serving officers with political ambitions can retire and join elective posts. By law, those who retire below fifty years of age may be called upon, when there is serious need, for redeployment. Impliedly, they remain under UPDF ostensibly as reservists. This distinguishes the ten UPDF representatives in Parliament who must be serving officers from those who may retire to join politics though the latter may be called upon to serve in case of serious need owing to their age. Some officers and former commanders have retired and joined politics. Political co-optation closely links the political and military, blurring lines of division.” P. 545
- “Thus, Amin’s regime survived on murderous brutality, Museveni’s “friendliness” and “tolerance” enhance coup-proofing by creating a hybridity of authoritarian and democratic tendencies…” p. 547
- “Likewise, Museveni’s regime combines politicization – or political co-optation – with surveillance and other institutional measures like elections to signal to military elites that they are both sharing the pie and that the regime is legitimately constituted by the voters.” P. 549

Abstract: Statebuilding is the declared objective of international donors in many African contexts and elsewhere. Uganda, where a civil war ended 20 years ago, can serve as a showcase in order to see what the outcome of internationalised post-war policies is. Analysing the dynamics around the state’s armed forces and the problems of taxation, this article argues that the outcome is not statebuilding but the internationalisation of rule. This constellation, nowadays euphemistically called ‘global governance’, may show the future of other current post-war interventions.

- No good notes


Abstract: Though peace and a new inclusive form of politics were promised, Museveni’s Uganda has been plagued by a series of civil wars. This article explains the continuation of and propensity towards conflict by focusing on the country’s ‘elite bargain’, defined as the distribution of positions of state power between contending social groups. Analysing Uganda’s elite bargain in terms of political, economic, military, and territorial power sharing, the article argues that it has been only partially inclusive. Political, military, and economic power have remained ethnically biased in favour of groups from western and central Uganda, and this in turn has been a major driver of recurrent civil wars. Increased territorial power sharing since the late 1990s helps explain the recent decline in violent conflict, and may also help prevent new civil wars.

- “Military power sharing has been even more limited. Complaints about the ‘entrenchment of Bahima/Banyankole/Banyarwanda hegemony’ in the officer corps of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) (as the NRA was later renamed) surface in the late 1980s and have persisted until today.” P. 401

Recruitment

Kasasira, Risdel. “Want to join the army? Here is how it’s done.” *The Daily Monitor* October 31, 2013.

Abstract: This article discusses recruitment in Uganda to the UPDF. Health and education minimums must be met, before recruits go on to training at Kaweweta Military Training School. The UPDF said the most important characteristic is that they must be a Ugandan citizen, and one of good character. The article outlines the buildup to the country wide recruitment, including how the army announcing the coming recruitment on the media. It also outlines the daily life of a soldier, an excerpt of a soldier’s diary in the training camp, the requirements for joining, and promotions.

- Placing an emphasis on hiring men into the army who have studied science subjects so they can fly planes and operate computerized weapons
- Most important requirement is that they are a Uganda national, “He must be a Ugandan of good character”
- Spend 9 months being initiated into military life
- Explains typical day of trainee
- List of requirements for joining the army, hit, citizen, age, education, documents, no criminal record etc.
- Except of one’s diary; said they wanted to work for NGO but 2 years no success so joined military
- Spend 6 weeks no sleep
- Endure a lot of hardships


Abstract: This article reports on the death of a UPDF recruit during training camp. The recruit went into cardiac arrest during training drills. The article also discusses how the army is looking to hire professionals such as health workers and engineers. Furthermore, the article outlines requirements for recruits.

- Prospective UPDF recruit dies after rigorous training of beginning of nationwide enlistment
- Died of cardiac arrest
- Giving priority to doctors and engineers in enlistment


Abstract: This independent report has been commissioned by USAID and UNICEF to examine assumptions and evidence about the needs and experiences of children and adults who have been forced to serve under the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and have subsequently escaped, surrendered or been captured by the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF). In particular it focuses on the process of ‘reintegrating’ formerly abducted people (FAPs) through reception centers, and the various challenges facing FAPs when they are reunited with their families. In addition it deals with a range of specific issues, outlined in the Statement of Work (SOW), including that of women who have been kidnapped, raped, impregnated by LRA combatants (commonly referred to as ‘child mothers’), the role of the UPDF in the FAP return process, and the part played by the Amnesty Commission.

- “Treatment by the UPDF was mixed. Some reported kindness from particular officers, but a few reported abuse. Whatever their subjective experiences, the number of days that FAPs are kept by the UPDF exceeds 48 hours. On average they are kept for two weeks. Some FAPs reported pressure to join the UPDF or LDUs, but the research team did not find this to be a widespread problem. The research team interviewed FAPs who have joined the 105th Battalion of the UPDF (which is largely made up of LRA veterans). They all stated that they chose to join, and all looked like they were over the age of 18. Underage recruitment in the LDUs was found to be a common problem.” P. vii
- where are they now chart… p. 7 – returnees 1995-00, 5% went to the UPDF, 2001-05, 4% went to UPDF
- “FAPs are terrified of the UPDF. Leaving the bush and the LRA is a frightening experience in itself, but surrendering oneself into the hands of the enemy is the worst part for most. Many are convinced that the UPDF will kill them, yet they take the risk and escape nonetheless.” P. 29
- “Those who reported losing their fear gave very specific descriptions as to how the soldiers made them feel safe. Sometimes it is based on a personal connection (‘The soldiers were from her village and so at first sight they began to cry for the injuries I had sustained from the bush’). But in most cases it is based on the treatment the FAPs experience: warm welcomes and being given biscuits straight after being picked up by the UPDF, being given water for bathing, porridge or other food and soda to drink, being allowed to watch movies even with the other soldiers, receiving wound treatment and general reassurance that there was no reason to be afraid.” P. 29
- “Language barriers are a major contributor to fear. One FAP says that he felt safe at the main barracks as opposed to the detach since he was the only Langi in the detach, but there were some fellow Langi soldiers in the main barracks. Another said that ‘other people were very bad to me since I was Teso, it was only another Teso in the UPDF who helped me otherwise I would have been killed.’ “ p. 30
- “The UPDF often states that they are very careful about recruiting former LRA combatants. Soldiers working in the CPU in Kitgum or Gulu have said that they do not pressure FAPs to join the UPDF, but some FAPs wish to join out of their own initiative. On the surface, there is also an awareness of the issue of recruiting children into the army – Public Relations Officers are very quick to point out that nobody under the age of 18 is allowed to join the UPDF.” P. 31
- “Most people from the research sample, who had passed through the UPDF, were asked to join, but purely as an option: ‘the officer was also saying that if I wanted to join the UPDF I was free to join. But I was also free to go home.’ The majority of people state that they were not pressured and that it was actually made clear to them that they were free to do whatever they wanted. However, in most cases this also means that they were not made aware of other options open to them: The research team found that hardly any FAPs were informed about the option of applying for amnesty in the barracks.” P. 31
- “Others, although a smaller number, reported being persuaded (‘The soldiers suggested that anybody that wanted to join UPDF could do it and that if anyone did, they would give him 10,000 Ugandan Shillings there and then’) or pressured (‘They suggested that I join the UPDF since even if I came back home I would be killed’). The prospect of joining the UPDF is a daunting thing for some (‘The UPDF asked me to join them but I refused and then I escaped from them and I came back home.’) Occasionally there is an emphasis on the virtues of being with the UPDF (‘They told me to join the UPDF because there was no use of us going back home because maybe our parents are even dead now and that UPDF soldiers get good salary’).” P. 31
- “The 105th is a battalion made up of former LRA combatants and is deployed in southern Sudan and two districts in the north of Uganda. This has been the subject of much controversy, first because it has been suspected that some of the recruits may be under the age of 18 and second because it is questionable whether someone with a track record of human rights abuses in the LRA should be given a job in the army. There are concerns
that such a battalion might be used to terrorize populations, because so many of the recruits will have already perpetrated atrocities. The battalion has had a low profile since it was formed, fueling speculations in the community that the UPDF is in fact using it as ‘cannon fodder’ in Sudan.” P. 32

- “Within the UPDF there is a strongly held view that recruiting former combatants into the UPDF and giving them proper training is one of the most effective mechanisms of ‘reintegration’.” P. 32

- “Six percent of respondents recounted being personally abused while in the hands of the UPDF. The severity of this abuse varies. Some report being beaten or threatened with physical punishment while being interrogated: ‘I was almost beaten by some soldiers because I did not have the amnesty card, they said I should get mine.’ Much of the abuse is name-calling and intimidation…” p. 36


Abstract: This article explores the state-sanctioned recruitment of internally displaced persons (IDPs) into civil militias in northern Uganda between 1996 and 2006. Drawing upon international and Ugandan domestic law, as well as empirical research in Uganda, it provides an illustrative case study of the circumstances in which IDPs were mobilised into an array of civil militias. By applying a framework elaborated by the UN Commission on Human Rights, it discusses, and subsequently determines, the lawfulness of this mobilisation. When doing so, the article highlights how, in Uganda, civil militias were dealt with completely outside of domestic law, despite repeated calls from Ugandan MPs to establish their lawfulness. It finds that government authorities long denied any liability for the conduct of the militias, and argues that the uncertain position of the civil militias created plenty of room for unmonitored conduct and substantial human rights abuse.

- “The Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF), on the other hand, was tasked with protecting the camps but in effect often responded inadequately to the LRA’s attacks. What was worse, many of these soldiers also committed human rights violations of their own against the camp populations, including arbitrary killings, torture and ill-treatment.” P. 202

- LDUs recruited by the UPDF

- “Equally, one of the most debated provisions in article 4, which in paragraph 2 provides that “[e]ach regular force, reserve force or any other prescribed force shall…be under the immediate supervision and control of such officers as may be prescribed by the Defence Forces Council”. While the Ministry of Defence argued that it is precisely the Defence Forces Council (rather than the Ugandan Parliament) that is “best suited to make the assessment and provide for a response to the perceived threat”, and should therefore “be given the power to do that without having to come back to Parliament”, certain MPs warned of the potential unconstitutionality of permitting “soldiers to expand the army at their will”.” P. 217

Life in the Military/Military Codes of Conduct

Abstract: This article discusses intra-familial tensions and related implications of fraught relationships for government soldiers’ livelihoods systems in war-affected areas of northern Uganda. While anthropologists have long recognised households as dynamic zones of contestation, development practice continues to perceive households as the central dwelling of cooperative families. Heads of household are assumed by humanitarian organisations to be benevolent representatives of the family, but this may conflict with the realities of compound-level tensions, leading to a loss of access to resources by the most vulnerable. The concept of livelihood units may be a more correct focus than the notion of households, but the former can be difficult to measure. Analysts must therefore take care to study households not only as units of analysis but also as units to be analysed. Relative wealth and poverty are shown here to exist under the same roof because soldiers and others practice inter- and intra-household discrimination. No family can be maintained on a private’s salary, and some soldiers require additional aid from their families in order to support themselves in barracks. The itinerant lifestyle and stresses of frequent relocation of army families produce distinct social, health and financial liabilities. Soldiers’ wives and children were among the least healthy of all in the study, and the relations between soldiers’ wives and mothers were often characterised by bitter discord. Such micro-cleavages contrast with the expectations on the part of government and the international community regarding the need to forgive those who pursue violent, militarised livelihoods in northern Uganda.

- “In separate interviews, soldiers and household members were asked to categorize individual levels of dependency on the soldier, ranked as either all, most, some or no needs. During our interviews, soldiers in barracks estimated their assistance to be more important than the receiving beneficiaries reported to us during visits to households,… In surveys of households affiliated with 38 soldiers, by contrast, only seven of 336 people (2 per cent) claimed to be fully dependent on a soldier, and no more than 7 per cent reliant for ‘most’ of their needs.” P. 422


Abstract: Northern Uganda is slowly recovering from two decades of war but prospects for comprehensive peacebuilding still remain dim. This article analyses how the nature of personal rule in Uganda in the period 1986–2006 has shaped the development of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) in terms of military professionalism. Building on this analysis, it further assesses the UPDF’s protracted war against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the north. The article draws on theories which contend that personal rule, civil or military, tends to weaken military professionalism in the long run because rulers prioritise loyalty at the expense of military professionalism in order to maintain their own political power. It argues that a lack of military professionalism contributed to the prolongation of the war in the north. First, it has hampered the military capability of the UPDF *vis-à-vis* the LRA and second, it has led to widespread human rights abuses against the civilian population.
- “One of the key programmes promised by Museveni in his 2001 presidential campaign was to professionalize the military. Yet, a report presented in the same year by a special parliamentary committee on the performance of the ministry of defense observed that Museveni’s personal interference made it difficult for the UPDF to even make operational decisions without his consent. The report goes on to say that the president even involves himself in the details of UPDF procurements. This has had large consequences for professionalization of the armed forces.” P. 198

- “Museveni has always relied heavily on his younger brother General (Rtd.) Salim Saleh, and during the past decade the successful military career of his son Lt. Colonel Muhoozi Kainerugaba has been closely tied to the office of the president. Saleh joined his brother’s struggle at the age of 16 and became very popular among the rebel soldiers. Since 1986 Saleh has, at various times, served in high positions such as chief of combat operations, army commander, commander of the reserve forces, special presidential advisor in northern Uganda and special presidential advisor on military affairs and security. Second, Museveni’s son joined the army as a private in 1999. He saw a steady promotion of ranks in the UPDF after he passed out from the prestigious Sandhurst military academy in 2000. He rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel in 2007 and his latest appointment came in August 2008 when President Museveni made him commander-in-charge of the development of special forces, a new elite set-up to control large segments of the armed forces.” P. 201

- “Although Museveni is known to interfere directly in promotions, he does give high-ranking military officers some autonomy as long as they remain loyal and do not become too popular.” P. 201

- “Since 1986 the army and active-duty army officers have been heavily involved in a wide range of ‘productive activities’, many of which can be classified as ‘grand corruption’. Individual high-ranking military officers have however benefited immensely from lucrative private business in Uganda and abroad…According to many observers, corruption among top officials has also been instrumentally allowed to reinforce Museveni’s system of patronage.” P. 202

- “The Porter Commission that investigated the illicit exploitation of natural resources in the DR Congo also concluded that ‘the UPDF appears to do whatever it likes, even when specifically told not to by its commander-in-chief, and this raises the whole question of transparency and accountability within the UPDF’.” P. 202

- “These conclusions reinforce our main argument that the UPDF is largely unprofessional due to personal rule.” P. 202

- “Senior military officers have also practiced illicit payments to so-called ghost soldiers in the UPDF. Although the issue of irregular payments has been there since 1986, the ghost soldier phenomenon is reported to have arisen in the mid-1990s in the 4th Division based in Gulu, Acholi sub-region. The magnitude of the embezzlement in the UPDF finally forced President Museveni to establish a three-member committee chaired by the Minister of Defence, the other members being General (Rtd.) Salim Saleg and General David Tinyefuza, all from his inner circle.” P. 202

- “Formally the 1995 Constitution of Uganda established parliamentary oversight of the armed forces. In practice, however, the military elite under the commander-in-chief has the final word in all matters that are considered as national security. ICG notes that
Despite an ongoing defence review, ‘it is doubtful that the NRM is willing to let it [the army] become fully accountable to the parliament and subject to public scrutiny.’” P. 203

- “First, the parliament was not consulted prior to the launch of foreign military operations such as Safe Haven in 1998 and Operation Lightning Thunder 2008 in DR Congo, and the 2002 operation called Iron Fist in Southern Sudan. Second, MPs have little say in military budgetary allocations. Omitoogun points out that funds budgeted for other ministries, particularly the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Police Headquarters, often end up being spent on the UPDF. The rational for this practice, he explains, is to avoid the 2 per cent ceiling on defense set by donors.” P. 203-4

- “The current army MPs are nominally non-partisan, but they tend to vote consistently with the government. They can also directly curb opposition in parliament. It is also illustrative for the active military involvement in political affairs that active-duty military officers have often served as ministers under Museveni’s presidency. As recently as in the 2001-2006 Cabinet, three generals served as ministers and other high ranking officers were appointed ministers of state.” P. 204

- “The effect has been that whole Acholi sub-region has been governed militarily for more than twenty years. As the previous section argued, this approach is integral to Museveni’s personal rule. One former Ugandan cabinet minister remarked that the war in the region has continued because Museveni has insisted on being the ‘fountain of solutions’ for the region, meaning even his own cabinet was often not consulted. The Ugandan parliament had even less say, and when parliamentarians wanted to declare the region an emergency zone in 2004, the president refused.” P. 205

- “Major Amaza, a loyal Bush War veteran, argues that indiscipline and rumours of corruption were widespread in the first years in power of the NRM/A regime, and that this caused low morale among the soldiers, which ultimately led to the failure to defeat the early insurgency in the Acholi sub-region.” P. 206

- “Despite its good track record during its first months in the north, the military carried out a number of attacks on Acholi civilians involving gross acts of violence amounting to massacres in the period 1986-1990.” P. 208


Abstract: The return of interstate war in Africa after the end of the cold war and global awareness of predatory economic motivations for war raises the question of whether African states are reviving early modern European methods of building states. This study of Uganda’s intervention in Congo reveals that this is not so. Uganda’s peripheral position in the world economy, coupled with its relations with creditors, gives its leaders unexpected capabilities to plunder a neighbouring country’s resources. Creditors remain surprisingly willing to tolerate this behaviour, while providing debt relief. Uganda’s leaders exploit creditor anxieties about growing disorder among highly indebted countries and fears that chaos will undermine creditor efforts to manage uncollectable debt. Nonetheless, warfare, plunder and manipulation of creditor interests does not result in stronger institutions. The predatory behaviour of the Ugandan military resembles that of their state-building counterparts. But contemporary plunderers form their own ties to the world economy. Uganda’s leader faces greater obstacles to consolidating control over
violent commerce, and private interests of plunderers actually weaken existing central political
control as Uganda’s leaders and its creditors become even more tied to new loans to maintain
short-term order.

- “By mid-1996, the UPDF was deeply involved in assisting fighters of the Alliance des
Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo (ADFL). Uganda officials justified
the UPDF’s intervention as a strategy to drive Ugandan insurgents away from Uganda’s
western border. This arrangement also gave UPDF officers, opportunities to profit from
local trade. Ultimately, this development gradually deprived Uganda’s ruler of control
over violence and posed a growing danger that military factions would fight each other
for spoils of war.” P. 422

- “UPDF forces have controlled large parts of northeastern Congo since 1997 after they
helped Kabila to power. The UPDF extended their areas of occupation when they backed
another rebel group in August 1998, the Rassemblement pour la Democratie Congolaise,
(RDC) to overthrow Kabila after he denounced his former allies as foreign invaders,
failed to impose order, and abandoned commercial deals he made while a rebel leader.
The UPDF quickly occupied Kisangani, a major trading city with river and air transport
facilities.” P. 422-23

- “But this classic self-help strategy is difficult to justify in the context of global norms that
maintain the principle of sanctity of borders. As details below show, the violation of
sovereignty more than the issue of looting irritated Uganda’s creditors and diplomatic
backers. More important, the deployment of UPDF troops 1,000 kilometers west of
Uganda’s border suggests that other motivations came to overshadow borderland
security. The behavior of UPDF officers show that personal economic motivations may
have proven more attractive than organizational imperatives of an efficient intervention
against threats to the Ugandan state, and shaped the character of the intervention.” P.
423

- “A UN report accuses high officers in the UPDF of using aircraft and military airports to
organize this and other trades, including trafficking in stolen vehicles, agricultural
products and minerals.” P. 423

- “It is more significant how this theft shapes the organization of Uganda’s army and its
relation to state institutional power. Clearly some officers profit personally.” P. 425

Lautze, Sue. “Livelihood systems of enlisted Ugandan Army soldiers: honour and reform of the

Abstract: This article explores the livelihood pathways of serving Ugandan Army soldiers and
traces their methods and motivations for enlistment. All were from areas of northern Uganda
affected by nearly two decades of violent instability. With the Uganda People’s Defence Forces
(UPDF) increasing recruitment eligibility requirements and taking other measures to improve
professionalism, some soldiers enlisted using false credentials and names, travelled to skirt
unofficial ethnic quotas, and joined against their family’s wishes. The Army’s defence reform
process was intended to preclude such problems. The article concludes with reflections on what
strategic deception (by both recruits and the Army) may imply for warriors’ honour.

- “The most notable challenge to the integrity of the Army has been the so-called ghost
soldier scandal…No longer able to track each soldier, the loss of records was exploited
by various paymasters and officers because army payrolls were released based on the reported size of each division. Corrupt soldiers benefited by exaggerating the number of soldiers in each division by keeping those who had died or deserted on payroll rosters.” P. 636

- “The UPDF has been engaged in defense reform with international donor support since 2002, based on a 2001 election promise by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to professionalize the army.” P. 636

- “With the support of the United Kingdom and other donors, the UPDF introduced reforms to counter indiscipline and to improve professionalism, transparency and efficiency, including the promulgation of the UPDF Act in 2005 to bring the military institution in line with the 1995 Constitution.” P. 637

- “In addition, under the current programme of professionalization, the Army is working to eliminate ethnic and religious identity within the institution by closing all churches on army bases, not (officially) collecting information on soldiers’ race, banning all formal and informal ethnic organizations within the service, and by holding recruitment exercise all over the country for example. Nevertheless, the UPDF continues to be doffed by recurrent accusations of prejudicial treatment on these same grounds. Last, the government has markedly increased education requirements for enlistment.” P. 637

- “Aside from their quarters at the barracks in Lira or Jinja, soldiers identified 79 households to which they were affiliated. Of the 47 soldiers, 27 reported one household, nine had two additional households, and ten had three. Only one soldier claimed four households. The total number of households was strongly correlated with soldiers’ ages, with the total number of households increasing as soldiers aged.” P. 638

- “For 24 soldiers, the UPDF was their first wage-earning job. The remaining 23 had been on non-militarized livelihood trajectories prior to enlistment, including teaching primary school. Other pre-UPDF occupations included shop owning, construction, farming, and fishing. The cohort also included a former welder, an office worker and a porter. One soldier had served as a local government official while another had established his own non-governmental organization…How and why such individuals ended up in the army is the focus of this section.” P. 639

- “Insecurity directly and indirectly interrupted the soldiers’ studies and education-related employment opportunities. Violence limited education and employment directly through attacks on schools and related ‘forced recruitment’ into the LRA through abduction and indirectly through the loss of the productive and financial capital bases of Lango livelihoods. Among other factors, war and its encumbering effects closed off non-militarized livelihood pathways, thereby shaping the decisions of the men and women in the cohort to join the army.” P. 639

- “Violent attacks on schools affected some soldiers’ livelihood strategies. A number of soldiers in the cohort had intended to become teachers rather than soldiers but had lost their positions due to attacks on schools. During the war, many schools in northern Uganda struggled to stay open and pay teachers in the face of insecurity and low levels of development investment. Under such circumstances, salary payments could be limited and sporadic… “I joined simply because the rebels went and burned all my grass thatch houses and the situation was not all that OK. Even the school where I was teaching was closed for about 3 months because of the rebels. So I was not employed. There was no
money. So I thought that by joining the army, that I might still help with the insecurity problem”.” P. 640

- “Others, such as Opio Emmanuel, were discouraged about their prospects of continuing as a teacher in the army schools: “Education for the children of the army is there, but to enter into it [as an army teacher], to follow that programme is, very, is a long way. First of all you have to go up to the general headquarter and fill the form. And from there, if you don’t give again something to those people [i.e., pay a bribe]...maybe, your problem may also not be solved. That one I can also say is that corruption these days, in our institution, very, is too much.”” P. 640

- “Only three soldiers reported that they discontinued their education because they had attained a level of education they found adequate for their life’s ambitions. Three soldiers left school to marry and four said that a need for employment disrupted their formal learning. Twenty-seven soldiers cited ‘no money for fees’ as the primary reason for dropping out of school, and a further seven listed this as a secondary factor. Insecurity was directly responsible for seven soldiers leaving school and was a secondary issue for many others. Several soldiers bitterly recalled the conditions that led to their loss of access to education. Owii Thomas said, ‘When I went to school and I went back to collect the school fees, I found the rebels had taken my brother. He didn’t come back. He just died there.’.” p. 640

- “As with at least 13 other soldiers in the cohort (including six who had enlisted in 2005), Okopa Paul joined the Army by using his brother’s name which he was still using at the time of my interview. He said, ‘I have a brother who completed S4 but because I stopped in S2, I didn’t haven’t the proper level of education for the army, so I joined using my brother’s papers.’ Another soldier had used a relative’s computer science certificate to join the army. On the basis of this qualification, the private was selected for UPDF training in signals and logistics, training for which the soldier was ill-prepared.” P. 641

- “With education a high priority for the cohort, their relatives and dependents, some soldiers used their salaries to pay the school fees of the next generation of Langi, especially at the secondary school level. These soldiers invested in the education of select relatives in part to break the cycle of militarization.” P. 641

- “The seemingly stark choices facing youth in northern Uganda were exemplified by Ojok Andrew, who had been living in an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp prior to joining the Army in 2005. He had thought to himself ‘Let me go away [and enlist] and possibly I will not be a victim the next time when these people [the LRA] come back and maybe kill me also.’.” p. 642

- “Among these motivations was the apparent benefit of modest increases in income. In 2005, UPDF private soldiers were earning slightly more than when they were entry-level teachers.” P. 642

- “While most soldiers’ decisions to join up were deliberate, they were not described as optimal. Some of the younger soldiers scorned the cruel twist of fate that had landed them in the Army instead of the classroom. Odoch William joined the army in 2005 after living with the extended and tragic consequences of war in northern Uganda. His grandfather was killed in 1989. The LRA murdered his father, burned their house and ‘took everything’ in 1993. In 2004, the LRA killed his paternal uncle and maternal aunt. He cited all these attacks as primary motivations for joining the Army. The last straw came when his remaining family members were forced to move to an IDP camp.” P. 645
“Due to the problematic history of ethnicity in the Ugandan armed forces, the UPDF is sensitive to charges of ethnic bias and tries to preclude disproportionate ethnic representation by recruiting all over the country.” P. 645

“Misinformation at recruitments, it was alleged, extended also to the UPDF. All soldiers were recruited as privates, and 44 remained so at the time of interviews. A few of the (truly) more educated soldiers were disgruntled by their lack of rank. They charged that the UPDF had misled them by asserting that they would be joining the officer corps. Obote Victor thought they were ‘coming for officer training as a cadet. But people are surprised and people are shocked to see that people are just like privates.’ Reflecting on his training at the time of our interview, Opio Emmanuel described a loss of trust in the UPDF: ‘Again, they [the UPDF] are deceiving us. [They said] that after finishing this course we might again get something, but from what I’ve seen that’s the logic. That’s only the logic, to them. You don’t believe them? No, I don’t believe. They have deceived us and we have now known what it is. It doesn’t sound like you trust the Army very much. Anyway, I don’t have much trust like those days. Anyway, those days used to be ok. When they say something, it used to be ok. But now, no. When were those days? Like the early [19]’90s, there.’” p.647

“In seeking to avoid many of the institutional vulnerabilities that historically characterized the national armed forces of Uganda, the UPDF has set a higher standard for its recruits and has invested in strengthened training regimes for its soldiers. It has worked to diminish opportunities for illicit advancement and exploitation of militarized livelihoods in Uganda based on identity, such as ethnicity and religion.” P. 647

“The soldiers’ pathway analysis found that the motivations for enlistment were not, for the most part, driven by fervent nationalism. Some soldiers held out only the lowest expectation of their time in service: to not be killed.” P. 648

“While armed soldiers seeking adventure may not serve Uganda well, a sense of honor is important. Warrior codes of honour are credited with placing limits on violence for centuries. Honour is both reinforced and underpinned by military codes of discipline and regulation. Honour is the foundation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) which codifies the limits of violence that may be prosecuted against other soldiers, those hors du combat, and civilians.” P. 648

“Cracks in the honour of the UPDF were discovered in the course of the research. Some of the soldiers in the cohort, including soldiers who had joined up recently, defied the wishes of family, local authority and community by enlisting, first by ‘escaping’ in the dead of night and then by adopting false identities and using forged credentials...other issues of honour extended beyond the cohort and into the realm of the systemic as well, such as the soldiers who reported widespread problems of theft of personal belongings by other soldiers, and those who detailed corruption in the Army’s health service, in the provision of rations in educational opportunities.” P. 649


- Covers when persons subject to military law
- Offences of the military
General code of conduct


Abstract: A report that lines out the compositions, organs and structures of the Defense Force, employment of the Defense Force, terms and conditions of service, persons subject to military law, offences, arrests, searches and handling of persons arrested, the working of the military courts and trials, punishments, post-trial matters, appeals, revision and general matters.

- 125 page document outlining the composition, organs and structures of the defence forces; employment of the defence forces; terms and conditions of service; persons subject to military law; offences; arrestsm searches and handling of persons arrested; military courts; trials; punishments; post-trial matters; appeals; revision; and a general section.


Summary: While the diplomatic aspects of conflict resolution are important to understand, in light of a long-term peace agreement still not being signed, this article will focus only on the military aspects of this protracted struggle. Specifically, it will examine some of the military reasons for the failure to end a war that has dragged on for nearly two decades. Despite their superior numbers, the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF), composed of approximately 60,000 members, has been unable to secure a final decisive victory against the LRA, whom they outnumber by approximately ten to one.

- “The UPDF shortcomings are numerous, beginning with a general lack of competent, dedicated military professionals. A glaring example of this occurred when LRA rebels attacked the Lira Palwo camp, which contained approximately 6,000 IDPs, on 19 March 2004. Twelve civilians were killed and over 100 thatched hutches burned. Captain Kavuma, a unit commander for the army, was later arrested for failing to protect the camp. It was alleged his team was ill-prepared and that he failed to radio for help in a timely manner. Additionally, eyewitnesses testified that several of his officers were drunk.” P. 46
- “Numerous other examples exist of competence troubles within the UPDF. Clearly the problem is exacerbated by their use of soldiers as young as 15 years old, some possibly even younger. The difficulties in maintaining professionalism with individuals perhaps better classified as children than men must be daunting.” P. 46
- “While the UPDF has stated that it requires more fund for articles such as communications equipment, helicopters, and vehicles, there have been allegations of “ghost soldier” units that never existed except on payrolls, enabling corrupt officers to pocket the money. Perhaps if such corruption were eliminated, adequate funding would exist for additional training as well as the purchase of the requisite new equipment.” P. 46
- “The military’s heavy-handed tactics with the Acholi, as well as others, have resuled in the army alienating the people they claim to be protecting. A March 2004 report from Human Rights Watch accuses the security forces of repeated human rights abuses,
including rape, mutilation of male genitalia, and other forms of torture. Other reports are similarly damning, accusing the UPDF of worsening the situation in the North through acts such as torturing and beating to death individuals in the camps established for internally displaced people.” P. 47


Abstract: Much has been said about the ways in which masculinity allows men to exercise power over women. This paper is about the ways in which masculinity, as a set of ideas, allows men to exercise power over other men. It is also about the ways in which this exercise of power is both reinforced by and contributes to a context of violence and war. The paper does not seek to pretend that men do not resort to violence, rather it seeks to examine why they do so under some circumstances and not others, and how this is to an extent a politically manipulated process. Drawing on material from research in northern Uganda, this paper examines how in the face of the dynamic interaction between a model of masculinity and a context of violence, the possibility of developing alternative masculinities collapses. Unable to live up to the model, but offered no alternative, some men resort to acts of violence. Furthermore, weak states may perceive a benefit in this collapse of alternatives: the hegemonic model creates incentives for armed forces to exercise violence on the civilian population in ways which actively undermine civilian men’s sense of self. This may contribute to the state’s sense of control over both civilians and army, both of which are necessary for national and geo-strategic purposes. The role of the state in constructing and reinforcing this normative model of masculinity is therefore also examined.


Summary: For nineteen years the people of northern Uganda have suffered, victims of a war waged between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a brutal rebel group responsible for countless acts of willful killing, torture, mutilation and abduction, and the Ugandan government, whose undisciplined army, the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF), has committed crimes against civilians with near total impunity. While the war continues, the displaced people of northern Uganda remain isolated, ignored and unprotected, vulnerable to abuses by both rebel and army forces.

- “UPDF-administered beatings of civilians were extremely commonplace, but the killing of civilians, sometimes inside the camps, was also documented. In some camps, civilians faced UPDF abuse on a daily basis. The scale of UPDF abuse continues at an unacceptable level and the protection and accountability structures that would put a stop to such abuse are not in place.” P. 15
- “People found outside the camps are commonly assumed by the army to be rebels or “rebel collaborators” and frequently find themselves being shot at by the army. But several victims have been shot inside the camps. Many shootings occur at night at close range, and are deliberate and not merely cases of mistaken identity as the army often
asserts in its defense. Other deaths are the result of beatings so severe the victims dies.” P. 24

- “Regardless of the presence of possible rebels or rebel collaborators inside displaced persons’ homes inside the camps, the UPDF has the duty to take all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population under its control against the effects of attacks. Soldiers carrying out an attack must be able to distinguish between legitimate military targets and civilians. Shooting into huts inside displaced persons camps where there was no apparent rebel activity is an indiscriminate use of force in violation of the laws of war.” P. 26

- “The abuses were not just the acts of just a few undisciplined soldiers. People going out to the fields to harvest or fetch firewood and water invariably found themselves confronted by the UPDF, whose soldiers beat or tortured people almost every day for the first two months of 2005.” P. 26

- “The 11th Battalion has treated civilians, whom they are supposed to protect, in a callous and brutal manner. In Cwero camp, an old man was beaten to death by 11th Battalion soldiers. The man was out late at night attending a funeral. A witness narrated how soldiers ordered a group of people to disperse, and then beat the elderly man as he emerged from the latrine…” p. 27

- “Civilians alleged to be “rebel collaborators” are commonly detained and sometimes tortured or severely beaten with sticks as part of the interrogation process. Some of the detainees reported being held in pits with other prisoners for several days. Very few of those detained ever receive a trial.” P. 30

- “In Kitgum Matidi camp, the UPDF beefed up its presence due to increased LRA activity in the area in April 2004. The supposed “extra protection” turned out to be a nightmare for the residents of the camp. One woman described how “a lot of women were raped at that time.” Two women told Human Rights Watch about similar incidents of soldiers barging into their huts and raping them.” P. 33

- “The rapist then returned to the hut when the mother was out, kidnapped the victim and made her his third wife in September 2004. She lived in his hut in another camp for two months with the two other co-wives, became pregnant and returned to her mother after the “husband” mistreated her. As of the interview, the rapist was still in the barracks as a soldier and had not been punished.” P. 33

- “No effective accountability structure exists in the camps; reports of UPDF abuses rarely result in any investigation or prosecution of UPDF personnel. While there is a military detachment in each camp, police are few and far between in rural northern Uganda. Ultimately the level of discipline, protection of civilians and accountability rests on the will and personality of the immediate commander.” P. 41

- “More often than not, when a complaint is lodged with the barracks there is hardly ever any further investigation of the case – many interviewees described how they simply did not hear anything further on the case, not even an interview by an army investigator or prosecutor, leaving them with the obvious conclusion that nothing was done to investigate or punish the perpetrator.” P. 43

- “Many people expressed their fear of possible repercussions if they complain about abuses by UPDF soldiers. A Legal Aid Officer with the Norwegian Refugee Council in Kitgum said, “People fear to report a case – they think it is better to keep quiet. They have the fear that something terrible will happen if they report the case.”” p. 45

Abstract: Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels have been fighting in northern Uganda for the past two decades in conflict which has devastated the region. The group is notorious for abducting children and young people. Over 20,000 have been taken since the war began and turned into soldiers and rebel ‘wives’. This is the context of Uganda’s informal disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme. Rather than being an organised process set up to help consolidate peace at the end of war, it has largely been a necessary response to a flow of escaping former abductees, taking place within an on-going conflict. In 2006, the government of South Sudan began mediating peace talks between the LRA and the Ugandan government. Although the talks have yet to deliver, they have focused attention on managing an end to the conflict, including a formal programme of DDR to deal with those rebels remaining in the bush. Based on primary research – undertaken in Gulu, Kitgum, Kira and Apac Districts of northern Uganda in August and September 2005 and March 2006 – this paper lays out the problems that have marred earlier attempts to reintegrate former LRA combatants – and looks at the challenges that lie ahead.

- “The UPDF also decided to formalize the reintegraton of ex-combatants into the army with a unit, 105 Battalion, composed exclusively of former LRA combatants. Previously the LRA had been absorbed into the UPDF in an unstructured manner.” P. 399
- “Because of the lack of jobs, many returnees – abductees and commanders alike – have opted to join the UPDF. Former fighters have been absorbed into the Ugandan army since the start of the conflict, but in 2002, 105 Battalion was set up to cater specifically for the new arrivals. As of August 2005, the unit, based at Cet Kana, about 30 km from Gulu town, consisted of 912 soldiers. The number has since increased. Soldiers from 105 are attached to UPDF units in south Sudan and Northern Uganda, and they use their knowledge of LRA tactics to track down the rebels and hunt out arms caches. The recruits are allowed to keep their rebel ranks until they are sent for UPDF training, at which time they are reassessed.” P. 405
- “The Uganda army has a long and successful history of incorporating former rebel fighters. Nevertheless, the inclusion of ex-LRA did initially cause some concern, not least because of the groups appalling human-rights record. However, UPDF officers say that the LRA make remarkably good soldiers, and are extremely disciplined – perhaps because they are used to following military orders on pain of death.” P. 405
- “The UPDF describes the battalion as a ‘great success’, but that has not stopped allegations that the army is recruiting minors into the force, wooing them soon after their return, and before they have had a chance to pass through a reception center. The UPDF has also been accused of further stigmatizing the former rebels by keeping them in a separate unit.” P. 405-6
- “Several new recruits said that they had been asked if they would like to join the UPDF while they were still in the barracks, but added that they felt free to turn down the offer.” P. 406

From Summary: The UPDF and other government-related armed groups have contributed to fear and insecurity in northern Uganda. UPDF soldiers have arrested scores of civilians, with little evidence, on suspicion of rebel collaboration; some of the detainees are supporters of the unarmed political opposition. Suspects of treason or terrorism (death penalty crimes) are kept in detention without bail and without cause shown for up to 360 days. In practice this period is longer. There are also cases of UPDF torture, ill-treatment, and rape: in January 2003, UPDF soldiers severely beat a surrendering sixteen-year-old LRA child soldier so much that he was sure his backbone had been broken. He reported, “I was tied in the three-point way and kicked. I really regretted my decision to surrender. [LRA leader Joseph] Kony told us that the UPDF will kill you and I felt it was true.” In another case, two UPDF soldiers captured a girl aged thirteen and a nineteen-year-old woman returning from working in the fields; each soldier raped both the girl and the woman and both contracted the HIV virus from the rapes. Although the soldiers’ names were reported to the UPDF, it appears the only government response was to transfer them to another garrison.

- “The best-known case of summary execution occurred on September 16, 2002, when four UPDF mambas (armored vehicles) full of UPDF soldiers raided Gulu Prison. The raid was conducted under the command of the head of military intelligence of Operation Iron Fist, Lt. Col. Charles Awany Otema. According to eyewitness reports by prison inmates and confirmed by the assistant superintendent of Gulu Central Prison, 199 prison authorities (wardens) refused entry to the soldiers after the UPDF officers failed to produce a search warrant or any other document permitting them to enter.: p. 42

- “The UPDF beat him badly. The soldiers asked where his guns were, removed his uniform, and gave him very dirty clothes. “They started beating me in the barracks, loaded me on a vehicle and took me to Miajakulu detachment” where he said he was kicked and beaten “until I was sure my backbone was broken. I was tied in the three-point way and kicked. I really regretted my decision to surrender. [LRA leader Joseph] Kony told us that the UPDF will kill you and I felt it was true.” P. 44

- “The apparent increased incidence of rape is associated with the increased presence of the UPDF and the vulnerability of the displaced population. Girls are vulnerable to sexual assault when traveling from IDP camps to work in the fields of their original homes, and when traveling into town in the evenings as "night commuters." Young boys are also at risk.” P. 45


Abstract: A framework for understanding Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)’s apocalyptic theology as an internal strategy to “coercively radicalize” its captive subjects is presented, by comparison to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which shares key stages of captive indoctrination with ISIS. A violent experience of “entry,” religious rules learned in an “assimilation” process, and millenarian “grand narratives” framing violence as purification, are examined. These stages construct an image of group leaders as divinely endowed with spiritual
knowledge and access (i.e., charismatic authority). This can create a sense of dependency on the leaders and their instructions, potentially motivating violent and altruistic behavior from initially unwilling subjects.

- No longer could get access for some reason


Abstract: This news article discusses the arrest of Colon Dan Opit Odwee of the UPDF for allegedly having links with an unnamed rebel group. The article suggests that other soldiers have been arrested in different units for subversion relating to his arrest.

- 30 soldiers arrested for treason
- Apparent scheme to destabilize the government


Abstract: This article talks about a soldier of the UPDF who was accused of selling a tin of ammunition at a base in Somalia, likely to a Somalian. He was tortured by more senior UPDF officers. He was then charged with failure to protect war material, but his case was thrown out by the court. The article now suggests that he was flown to Somalia by the UPDF to be charged in a court there for a different crime, for the UPDF to finally have him locked up as they wish.

- Tortured by senior officers
- These officers flew him out of the country without his permission or request
- He was suspected of stealing a tin of ammunition
- Hasn’t been able to get medical treatment for torture wounds
- Trial for his treason in Uganda was annulled


Abstract: The Committee on Human Rights affairs chaired by Hon. Jova Kamateeka met with the chief of Defence Forces, General Katumba Wamala and the Director for Human Rights, Mr. Charles Angullo Wacha. The meeting aimed to establish the extent to which the Uganda Peoples Defence forces had undertaken the recommendations of the 17th and 18th Human Rights Commission reports. Some of the issues discussed include; The number of detainees and the conditions in Military facilities; The numbers and state of People living with HIV/AIDS and PWDS; The number of Civilians in Military facilities; The state of backlog in Military courts; The challenges face by the Military in relation to Human Rights; and the Mubende Rehabilitation Centre.

- Issues discussed were the number of detainees and condition in military facilities; number and state of people living with HIV/AIDS and PWDS; number of civilians in military
facilities; the state of backlog in military courts; the challenges face by military in relation to human rights; and Mubende rehab centre
- Conditions have been improved
- Mudende rehab center is for those who become disabled during army work


Abstract: This article talks about how US army personnel trained 66 UPDF officers in a two-day course on humanitarian law and rules of engagement. The purpose of this training was to improve and cultivate a respect for human rights and rule of law. The idea was that the training would allow UPDF soldiers to be able to train other UPDF soldiers. The course received high reviews according to the article.

- US army has been training Uganda soldiers on respecting human rights and following law in conducting their work
- Two day course and base with 66 officers
- Trained them so they could train others
- Course received high reviews from UPDF officers

N/A. “Frequently Asked Questions.” AMISOM.

Abstract: This is a list of Frequently Asked Questions commonly asked about AMISOM, the African Union Mission in Somalia; it addresses questions such as why is AMISOM in Somalia, who are the personnel, how long will the mission stay, how is it structured, what is the size of the force, and how is it funded.

- What is AMISOM; why are they in Somalia; who are the personnel; how long will they stay; how are they structured; what is the size; how are they funded
- 6 223 troops of the 22 126 size force are Uganda

N/A. “AU Recognizes Uganda’s Special Role in Pacifying Somalia.” African Defense 1 August 2016.

Abstract: This article discusses how Uganda was recognized for completing a year of duty in Somalia, and that it had played an essential role in establishing the country’s state institution and contributing to the country’s transformation. The articles notes how the two countries are committed to their continued partnership and support.

- “Uganda is in the right path; Uganda is doing the right things; Uganda is sacrificing for Somalia but more importantly, Uganda is playing its part in the overall african union objective of creating a united Africa Union”
- strong historical ties between Uganda and Somalia
- AMISOM and Somalia thanking Ugandans

Abstract: This website gives a summary chart of Uganda’s peacekeeping activities, including their active armed force, their number of helicopters, their defense budget, their uniformed UN peacekeepers, their UN contribution, and their other contributions such as to the AU. The page also breaks down Uganda’s recent trends in peacekeeping, and their decision-making choices and rationales for contributing to peacekeeping, as well as their barriers to contributing, their current challenges and issues, their key champions and opponents and their capabilities and caveats.

- Uganda as a newcomer to peacekeeping
- Began participating in 1990s
- 61 Ugandans currently deployed in peacekeeping
- they host the UN Regional Service Centre Entebbe which provides logistics support and peacekeeping training
- they are a leading troop contributor to African Union peace operations
- 2000 Ugandan troops are apart of UN-AU regional task force
- driven by political imperatives
- also seen as key foreign policy tool
- prefers to work through the AU, hence why UN contribution is low


Abstract: More than one hundred thousand uniformed peacekeepers were deployed in Africa in early 2015, twice as many as a decade before. Peacekeepers have deployed to Somalia, the western Sudanese region of Darfur, South Sudan, and Mali, to name a few countries where civil wars and rebellions have claimed civilian lives and threatened to destabilize surrounding regions. Peacekeepers in Africa are tasked with increasingly broad mandates, including civilian protection, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency operations, and operations increasingly depend on partnerships between the United Nations and African Union. Peace operations can be important for maintaining stability and safeguarding democratic transitions, experts say. However, multilateral institutions that deploy troops face challenges related to country contributions, training, and relations with host governments.

- AU establish peace and support operations when authorized by their respective peace and security council which is a fifteen member body that holds no permanent members
- Attempting to develop an African standby force with a reserve of more than twenty thousand peacekeepers


Abstract: Key Points: The Ugandan government is reviewing its foreign military deployments following cuts to the country's defence expenditure this month and a reduction in EU funding to
AMISOM in late 2016. The US is meeting this shortfall by providing equipment, training, and air and ground support of AMISOM members and Uganda is unlikely to withdraw before the end of the mission's extension to May 2017. However, Al-Shabaab's capability to conduct IED and small-arms attacks against aviation, government property, and hotels is increasing as Ethiopia and Kenya are unwilling to co-operate in active operations this year.

- Page no longer found


Abstract: Uganda currently has 2,500 troops in CAR hunting the remnants of the LRA, but they have now released a plan for a phased pull out of the UPDF from the Joint mission. Uganda feels as though they have shouldered this burden alone, amidst the promise of other troops from other countries; however, their plan to withdrawal is causing concern among the AU Peace and security Council. The LRA is believed to only have 200-300 men remaining and the US government believes it only needs one more push to bring the group to the end, but this requires the UPDF’s commitment.

- Plan to remove the largest and most effective contingent from the 2500 troop fighting force
- UPDF complaining of being left alone to shoulder the burden of the LRA


Abstract: The present report covers the period from 1 April to 12 August 2007, and highlights, inter alia, improvements in the security and human rights situation in the Karamoja region, advances by the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) in the scale and type of disarmament operations conducted, as well as an increased engagement by the Government in mobilization and confidence-building measures with different Karimojong communities.

- “On 8 May 2007, at Najokogolit village behind the UPDF detachment in Katikekile, reports received by OHCHR indicated that soldiers came across people leading their animals to water ponds. Reportedly, people started running away when they saw the soldiers approaching and one man was shot dead. The animals were confiscated and released after the army had recovered five guns from the community. During human rights sensitization exercise in Katikekile sub-county on 15 May 2007, OHCHR received corroborated information from different individuals interviewed, including some leaders of the sub-county, which indicates that between 7 and 11 May 2007, three men were killed during various cordon and search operations conducted by the UPDF19 Battalion. It was alleged that 16 others were subjected to acts of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment by soldiers during the operations, whilst being frogmarched to the military detachment for further questioning and during their period of detention.” P. 12
- outlines long lists of alleged abuses by UPDF soldiers against members of communities
- “During the reporting period, complaints from female victims about ill-treatment by soldiers have been on the rise. One woman lodged her complaint directly with the UPDF 3rd Division Commander on 11 July 2007 during a security mobilization meeting in Matany sub-county. She reported that she was hit with a stone by a [named] UPDF detachment commander, resulting in a gaping wound on her forehead. OHCHR noted that conflicting information was received about the cause of her wound; another source indicated that the victim fell and hit her head, or that she was tripped by a soldier whilst trying to run away. When interviewed, the victim replied that she had informed the local leaders who had promised to notify the authorities. Apparently, however, no follow-up investigations were made until she raised the issue at the public meeting. The UPDF Division Commander committed himself that an investigation will be launched into the allegations.” P. 16


Executive Summary: Uganda is a constitutional republic led since 1986 by President Yoweri Museveni of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party. Voters re-elected Museveni to a fourth five-year term and returned an NRM majority to the National Assembly in 2011. While the election marked an improvement over previous elections, it was marred by irregularities. Authorities usually maintained effective control over state security forces (SSF). The three most serious human rights problems in the country were a lack of respect for the integrity of the person (including unlawful killings, torture, and other abuse of suspects and detainees); restrictions on civil liberties (including freedoms of assembly, the media, and association); and violence and discrimination against marginalized groups, such as women (including gender-based violence), children (including sexual abuse and ritual killing), persons with disabilities, and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community. Other human rights problems included harsh prison conditions, arbitrary and politically motivated arrest and detention, incommunicado and lengthy pretrial detention, restrictions on the right to a fair trial, official corruption, mob violence, trafficking in persons, and child labor. Although the government occasionally took steps to punish officials who committed abuses, whether in the security services or elsewhere, impunity was a problem.

- The Uganda Police Force (UPF), under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, has primary responsibility for law enforcement. The UPDF is charged with external security but also had significant responsibility for recovering cattle stolen by rustlers in the Karamoja subregion and providing election-related security for byelections held during the year. The Internal Security Organization and External Security Organization, security agencies and intelligence-gathering entities under the minister of security, occasionally detained civilians. The Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI) is legally under UPDF authority and may detain civilians suspected of rebel and terrorist activity.

- “The government led regional efforts, backed by an African Union-mandated mission, to counter the influence of the LRA in coordination with South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the DRC. In July, AMISOM initiated investigations into alleged use of child soldiers in its ranks. This followed a May report by the UN alleging 14 cases of association of children with AMISOM in various capacities, including to man
checkpoints and as cooks. More than 6,000 UPDF soldiers served with the mission.” P. 34


Foreword: This issue of the International Review of the Red Cross addresses the importance of understanding armed groups and the norms by which they are bound. One way of gaining insight into armed groups and engaging with them on improving respect for the law is to examine the rules and decisions that they choose to adopt. In 2008, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) published a study on increasing the respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) in non-international armed conflicts. The study identified codes of conduct as one of the legal tools to improve compliance of armed groups with IHL. While they do not guarantee respect for the law, codes of conduct provide an important glimpse into the ideological and organizational structure of an armed group, its chain of command, and the rights and obligations that the hierarchy of the armed group chooses to bestow on its members. Furthermore, codes of conduct can provide a basis upon which legal representations can be made and accountability required regarding norms of IHL. Several authors in this edition of the Review discuss the importance of codes of conducts for understanding and engaging with armed groups. The Review has thus decided to include a collection of codes of conduct, or relevant extracts thereof. All materials in this collection are publicly available. They originate from various geographic areas and time periods—from China in 1947 to Libya in 2011—and provide an insight into different armed groups’ views of and appreciation of humanitarian norms. The publication of these codes of conduct does not in any way imply endorsement by the Review of the content of these documents.

- Another code of conduct that was used for the NRA
- Outlines how to deal with the public and relationships among soldiers

Uganda as Military Force in the Region


Abstract: Uganda’s army, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), has been operating on Sudanese territory since the late 1990s. From 2002 to 2006, a bilateral agreement between the governments in Khartoum and Kampala gave the Ugandan soldiers permission to conduct military operations in Southern Sudan to eliminate the Ugandan rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Instead of conducting a successful operation against Uganda’s most persistent rebels who had withdrawn into Sudanese territory and acted as a proxy force in Sudan’s civil war the UPDF conducted a campaign of abuse against Sudanese civilians. Drawing on extensive fieldwork conducted over several years, this article documents local experiences of a foreign army’s involvement in the brutal Sudanese civil war. It outlines why continued operations of the UPDF outside their borders recreate the same problem they purport to be fighting: abuses of civilians. Since 2008, US military support for the UPDF mission against the LRA has called into question
the viability of continued militarisation through an army that has committed widely documented human rights abuses. The foreign military has not brought peace to the region. Instead, it has made a peaceful environment less likely for residents of South Sudan.

- “It has been argued that the UPDF’s lack of military professionalism prolonged the war in the north, allowing for UPDF abuses of civilians. Despite abundant evidence, the international community has largely underplayed the UPDF’s role in Uganda, particularly in the displacement of local populations and in committing atrocities against civilians. The UPDF’s incursion into Sudan received no oversight to ensure civilians’ safety, leaving Ugandan soldiers to pursue its ‘counterinsurgency’ in Sudan, including atrocities against the population.” P. 130

- “The same report discussed suspicions the UPDF was “responsible for a number of attacks”, but concedes that while it “would be naïve to believe that former UPDF or elements of serving UPDF have not been involved in attacks at some point” this was unlikely to be routine and that the Congolese forces wanted the UPDF out of DRC and thus had a reason to discredit the Ugandan forces. However, it was acknowledged that the UPDF failed to disclose exact troop locations and was keeping patrols secret. In early 2012, CAR and DRC civil society leaders expressed concerns about unmonitored UPDF operations.” P. 133

- “The LRA’s military superiority meant that Sudanese civilians did not benefit from the presence of Ugandan soldiers. The chairman of the Sudanese Acholi community in Juba explained, “The resentment of people is that [UPDF] were never defending them. They did not go on a very effective encounter with the LRA although their missing was to fight them.” Sudanese traders particularly complained about the lack of protection from the UPDF.” P. 134

- “This force was sent to look for LRA in Southern Sudan and should protect and provide security to the civil society in Southern Sudan. But to our surprise, UPDF behave also like LRA. They have killed six people and wounded three in Pajok. They lay ambush on the road and take motorbike, bicycles or property, money, or kill you if you don’t run. These happened between Komormo and Pogee, Pajok. When they get you in the bush or any isolated locations, they kill you immediately without asking whether you are LRA or not. They killed three boys fishing again; they shot a boy in the compound. All these have proven with evidence. UPDF create information, which is not true in order to kill and lay ambush on the road in the name of the LRA. Recently UPDF killed [a man named] Sokondo. They also robbed some boys riding bicycles and carrying some items between Pajok and Owiny-Kibul, some two days ago. UPDF do not attack LRA, even if you report to them. They said: “Let the LRA…what do you want? I can harm yourself with a knife.” This makes reconciliation very difficult….So [the Ugandan government] should be accountable for the destructions.” P. 135

- “During the Juba Talks, Eastern Equatorians published a communique to be read out at the negotiation table. It outlined a list of UPDF atrocities: For example, instead of following and attacking the LRA, they turned their guns to the civil population, shooting, looting, raping and burning their huts in pretext of chasing the LRA. For example, 10 people in Lulobo were killed, also in Madi area two people killed and others wounded in the process. At Kitire in 2004, the UPDF killed the three escorts assigned to lead them to the hideout of the LRA.” P. 135-6
Residents say that the UPDF committed atrocities pretending to be the LRA. A woman in Magwi explained, “Sometimes when the UPDF did not have anything to eat, they turn and pretend to be the LRA and ambush you.” p. 136

“The notorious 105th battalion of the UPDF comprised of former LRA fighters with unclear command structures, was also dispatched to Sudan. The 105th battalion is a reminder of the complex nature of a war in which former rebels join armies to fight rebels, but also use rebel tactics.” P. 136

“When they were caught logging in the forest, they killed some civilians and at times “UPDF put on different uniforms to look like LRA”. The UPDF in Sudan, he concluded, “they forgot what they came for”.” P. 138

“Eastern Equatorians’ experience of peace – and fledgling efforts of civilian disarmament – were further disturbed because the UPDF presence also meant that Sudanese were being recruited as soldiers.” P. 141

“Writing in the Sudan Tribune in 2005, one Equatorian outlined why he felt that the UPDF presence had been damaging: the UPDF were proof that Uganda was moving its battlefield to Southern Sudan, he argued. The forces had sealed the border to assure peace in Uganda while fighting its war in Sudan; more civilians than Ugandan soldiers had been killed by the LRA; the UPDF presence had decreased security in Magwi, Ame, Opari, Pajok, Agoro and Pageri; people had been re-displaced since the Ugandan forces had arrived; time spent fighting the LRA was time taken away from Sudan’s own peace and development process; the Southern Sudanese government was misguided to hand over the task of fighting the LRA to Ugandans, and was hurting its own citizens in the process.” P. 142

“The UPDF has for years been criticized for fighting the LRA as if it was fighting a conventional enemy. Having persistently and unsuccessfully pursued the LRA in Uganda with military tactics more suited to frontline battle than to fighting an insurgency in difficult territory, the UPDF then exported the same inappropriate tactics to Sudan.” P. 145


Abstract: This paper analyses how Ugandan army commanders have mobilised transborder economic networks to exploit economic opportunities in eastern DRC during the military intervention of the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) in Congo’s wars (1996 97; 1998 2003). These transborder networks are the starting point of our evaluation of the informal political structures and networks linking Uganda’s political centre to Congo’s war complex. While it is often claimed that military entrepreneurism in the DRC has undermined political stability in Uganda, we argue that the activities of Ugandan military entrepreneurs and networks under their control were an integral part of Uganda’s governance regime. Crucial to the development of this entrepreneurialism was the existence of pre-war transborder networks of economic exchange that were connecting Congo to eastern African markets. Military control over these highly informalised networks facilitated UPDF commanders’ access to Congo’s resources. Rather than operating as privatised sources of accumulation, these military shadow networks were directly linked to the inner circles of the Ugandan regime.
- “In support of the Rwanda led military operation against the Kabila regime, two years later, UPDF troops again entered the DRC. This time, things did not go as smoothly as two years before. A growing number of sources started reporting on the involvement of high ranking UPDF officials or “entrepreneurs of insecurity” in what could be called acts of military entrepreneurialism”.” P. 3

- “In Equateur and Province Orientale, James Kazini constituted the link between UPDF officers and the Congolese leaders of armed groups. As UPDF Overall Commander in the DRC from 1998 to 2000, he became a close collaborator of Congolese rebel leaders – Mbuba Nyamwisi, John Tibasiima, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Mouvement … - all of whom facilitated his illegal dealings in diamonds, coltan, timber, counterfeit currency, gold and coffee.” P. 7

- “Another crucial personality and one of the most famous representatives of these military entrepreneurs was Salim Saleh, President Museveni’s brother. Endlessly diversifying his activities, he developed a resource accumulation strategy that skillfully mixed civilian and military business, charity and “legitimate corruption”, as well as national development and international capitalism.” P. 7

- “Uganda’s military presence in the DRC was largely based and depended on close collaboration between UPDF commanders and Congolese rebel leaders, traders and political elites. In order to consolidate its military position. The Ugandan regime concluded security arrangements with local elites that went much further than territorial and border control but also comprised private business deals. The UPDF made business in developing a dual economy of protection and extortion.” P. 7

- “Hema landowners started recruiting defense groups that soon acquired the support of some UPDF units, who started acting as private security guards for Hema elites. This security arrangement became the backbone of an emerging Hema politico-economic power base. Hema traders started operating under the protection of UPDF and succeeded in expanding their commercial enterprise, which ultimately connected local markets to Ugandan and international traders.” P. 9

- “For some observers, the political center lost control over the UPDF units operating in the DRC.” P. 10

- “For Reno, the violence perpetuated by the UPDF in northern Uganda after the transfer of the troops initially based in the DRC as well as the official decrease in gold exports, induce an increased capacity of informal networks to by-pass the state official economy and show the relative loss of control of the phenomenon by central government.” P. 12


Abstract: In 2003, the Ugandan government withdrew its army from the DRC and ended its involvement in armed conflicts there. But since then, Uganda has lent assistance to armed groups, failing to implement UN sanctions against the Congo, and enabled Congolese militia leaders to engage in political and financial activities in Uganda. Uganda has also created opportunities for the installation of Ugandan companies in north-eastern DRC and encouraged Ugandan participation in the Congolese gold trade. This article describes and analyzes the Ugandan involvement in the northeastern part of the DRC during the years 2003-2009: Uganda
has adopted a policy of "guns and butter" by taking part in the armed conflict while facilitating the access to natural resources and markets in the DRC.

- “Museveni has supported the “gun” by aiding and abetting armed groups in Congo, particularly during the period 2003-2005. As I will discuss further in this article, the Government of Uganda withdrew its army in mid-2003 from Congo’s Ituri District but continued to support various armed groups in Ituri by supplying them with arms, allowing them to engage in political and financial activities in Uganda, and providing them with training and logistical support.” P. 347
- “Uganda also pursued the “butter” of northeastern Congo’s natural resources and markets. Butter could be understood to be a simple metaphor for gold, but I use the term to refer to both the range of natural resources in northeastern Congo (incl. diamonds, gold, timber, and coffee), and Congo’s markets, to which Ugandan businessmen have increasingly exported agricultural and industrial products.” P. 347
- “The Ugandan occupation of parts of eastern Congo from 1998-2003 was characterized not only by economic exploitation, but also by numerous violations of international law. The decision of the International Court of Justice in the case DRC v. Uganda includes numerous damning findings, such as: “[T]he Republic of Uganda, by the conduct of its armed forces, which committed acts of killing, torture and other forms of inhumane treatment of the Congolese civilian population, destroyed villages and civilian buildings, failed to distinguish between civilian and military targets and to protect the civilian population in fighting with other combatants, trained child soldiers, incited ethnic conflict and failed to take measures to put an end to such conflict; as well as by its failure, as an occupying Power, to take measure to respect and ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in Ituri district, violated its obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law.” Uganda’s profoundly negative role in northeastern Congo during its period of occupation also created conflict among local groups that would continue for years.” p/ 352
- “The UPDF was a great source of instability in Ituri, but it also exerted some control over the Congolese groups with which it engaged in military operations and business enterprises; Uganda had been playing the role of both arsonist and fireman.” P. 354


Abstract: This news article reports that UPDF committed atrocities in Southern Sudan in a small village. The report claims that 30 armed UPDF soldiers raided one home in the village, stealing household goods and food, abducting one man and later murdering him roughly three kilometers from the village. The report was generated by the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team who advised that there needs to be further investigating and for the UPDF to cooperate and coordinate their responsibilities with the SPLA.

- UPDF accused of raiding home and killing man in a village
- UPDF masquerading as the LRA, so pretending to be them to not face charges for their crimes
- Document found near the dead man with UPDF soldier names and military ranks

Abstract: This paper enquires into the reasons for Uganda’s intervention in the recent Congo war, arguably the most important impediment to economic and political progress in sub-Saharan Africa. It examines a number of prominent arguments about the intervention, and determines that the Rwanda–Uganda alliance should be at the centre of a ‘thick description’ of the intervention. That is, the Uganda–Rwanda alliance was the key to President Museveni’s initial decision in, but other explanations contribute to our understanding of the intervention by providing information about its context, justification and permissive causes. Further, the paper suggests that Uganda’s initial reasons for entering Congo differ from its reasons for remaining there after having failed to realise its initial goals.

- “First, it is far from clear from the evidence that Uganda has experienced a net economic gain from its involvement in the DRC> There are considerable costs, as well as benefits, associated with Uganda’s intervention there. Most notably, the Ugandan defence budget increased by some 91 billion Ug. Shillings, or 89 per cent, for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1999 over the previous fiscal year. These figures do not include significant off-budget expenditures of the UPDF, which many knowledgeable Ugandans assume to exist. A number of very significant secondary economic costs have also accrued to Uganda from its Congo war.” P. 276
- “One illuminating analysis of the UPDF has described the army’s officers as being entrepreneurs of insecurity’, who acquire gains from conflict both within Uganda and outside, in Congo.” P. 277
- “…the UPDF was not initially enthusiastic about the war. One senior Ugandan military official told the International Crisis Group that Museveni actually had to convince a reluctant High Command to go along with the invasion.” P. 278


Abstract: In the northeastern Congo, Uganda has played the role of both arsonist and fireman with disastrous consequences for the local population. In their involvement in continuing political feuds among Congolese party leaders, in local ethnic conflicts, and in extracting wealth, Ugandan actors have furthered their own interests at the expense of Congolese whose territory they are occupying.

- Uganda has been playing a role in DRC in deciding local affairs
- They supported the Hemas, by helping to defend them and in return got payments
- Assistance of Ugandan soldiers and training has led to many civilian casualties
- Recruited and trained children for soldiers
- Illegally detained political leaders and have committed acts of torture

Abstract: During the night of 15 December 2013, fighting broke out between factions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Juba, the capital of the Republic of South Sudan. The fighting pitted forces loyal to President Salva Kiir against those loyal to former Vice President Riek Machar. Five days later, Uganda sent troops into South Sudan, advancing a number of reasons for intervention, including that it had been invited by the legitimate government of South Sudan to ensure order; it needed to evacuate Ugandan citizens caught up in the fighting; it had been asked by the United Nations Secretary-General to intervene; and that the regional organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development had sanctioned the intervention. As the conflict escalated, Ugandan troops started fighting on the side of forces loyal to Kiir. The underlying reasons for the intervention were clearly economic, but those advanced were legal. This article discusses both sets of reasons and concludes that the economic reasons are more persuasive. Nevertheless, while some of the legal arguments (such as being invited by the legitimate government of South Sudan) can be asserted, others are clearly dubious. In addition, the participation of Ugandan troops in the fighting on the side of the Kiir government renders the intervention illegal.

- “…a secret military cooperation agreement was signed between Uganda and Garang committing Uganda to provide equipment and training to the SPLA, as well as passports for travel abroad. Uganda also committed to provide the SPLA with free passage through the country while conducting its operations.” P. 355

- “Uganda has sought to justify its intervention in the current conflict in South Sudan by claiming it was invited by the constitutional and legitimate government. However, in order to legally justify the intervention on this basis, it is important to note the different phases of the UPDF’s intervention in the conflict. The first phase entailed the deployment of the UPDF to protect the vital infrastructure of Juba in order to enable the evacuation of foreigners. The second phase entailed the UPDF fighting on the side of the Kiir government. The two phases raise different conclusions regarding the (il)legality of the intervention.” P. 357

- “Nevertheless, this ground of intervention has become increasingly tenuous following revelations that the government of South Sudan did not write a letter to Museveni requesting intervention, as had earlier been claimed by officials of the Ugandan government. This would mean that there was no consent to the intervention by South Sudan.” P. 358

- “In the case of South Sudan, Uganda’s intervention seems to have gone beyond rescuing Ugandans caught up in the fighting. The announcement that the UPDF was fighting alongside government forces against the rebel troops supporting Machar clearly violates the requirement of proportionality, which demands that the action taken must not be ‘excessive’ (no more than is necessary to accomplish the stated objective). The UPDF fighting on behalf of one of the factions in the conflict points to an abuse of this state practice…” p. 359

- “In an editorial in its 16 January 2014 issue, *The Observer* stated that ‘many people had hoped that the UPDF’s intervention [in South Sudan] would be under the auspices of the regional group, the IGAD, which would have given such action more legitimacy’. In
other words, the paper does not view Uganda’s intervention as sanctioned by the region.” P. 360

- “According to the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBoS), bilateral trade between Uganda and South Sudan appears to have grown by 1000 per cent between 2006 and 2008. For both formal and informal trade combined, South Sudan has been the single largest destination of Uganda’s exports since 2007. In fact, during the Interim Period (2005-2011), Uganda emerged as South Sudan’s largest trading partner…the economic reasons elucidated above are justifiable grounds for Uganda’s intervention in South Sudan. No country would sit idly by and see its economy ruined by a conflict in a neighboring country that is its biggest trading partner and potential partner in oil matters.” P. 363

- “The effect on this [Cessation of Hostilities Agreement] CoHA is that Uganda should have started withdrawing its troops by 25 January 2014 at the latest. This, however, has not happened at the time of writing, three months after the signing of the CoHA. The continued presence of the UPDF in South Sudan is therefore a breach of the CoHA.” P. 363


Abstract: This article discusses the plan to set up an intelligence base in Uganda, on the border with DRC, comprised of 12 military intelligence officers from the Greats Lake Region to monitor “negative forces” in Eastern Congo, such as the ADF and the FDLR.

- Will be based at border between DRC and Uganda to monitor ADF
- Think that DRC is still rampant with “negative forces” due to lack of permanent intelligence and monitoring


Abstract: This article discusses the Ugandan security forces and their disregard for human rights, and the US military’s role in Uganda as Uganda is one of their biggest counterterrorism allies. Also, it is specifically looking at the election. The US has put a lot of money and training into the Uganda army, and the article is questioning whether the army will stay neutral during election time or whether it will work to keep Museveni in power.

- “The U.S. military has trained more troops from Uganda in the last 10 years than from any other nation in sub-Saharan Africa except Burundi. The Ugandan military has also received hundreds of millions of dollars worth of hardware from the United States. Its soldiers now have sophisticated communications equipment, night-vision goggles, and small surveillance drones — all from U.S. companies. Ugandan troops deployed to Somalia travel in mine-resistant vehicles that once ferried American soldiers around Afghanistan, while Ugandan choppers engaged in anti-Kony operations are powered by fuel paid for by the United States.”
- “The worry now is that a military that feels like it has leverage over the United States because of its importance in counterterrorism operations could feel emboldened to
intervene if necessary to keep Museveni in power. According to Ankunda, the military is legally allowed to assume domestic policing duties, and it has conducted joint exercises with the police in recent months. In the week before the election, both police and military forces have been deployed throughout the country in force—some say as a show of strength by the regime.”


Abstract: This paper will start with an explanation of the pre-colonial conditions in Uganda and will explore the army’s creation and the evolution of the military throughout Uganda’s history under different regimes. While a general history of the military is essential to understanding the militarization of Ugandan society and the nature of the current Ugandan state, this paper will primarily focus on the period from 1986 to the present. Uganda’s wider military history, while fascinating, is long, rich, and often bewildering. A thorough examination of such a history would be a great undertaking, but the primary purpose of this paper is to examine the UPDF under the direction of the current Museveni regime. This paper will also explain how the UPDF has created its international reputation by involving itself in external conflicts. Contrary to what the Ugandan government has claimed, the UPDF is sent abroad not for noble causes, but in an effort to silence those who might otherwise focus their criticism on Uganda and Museveni’s undemocratic policies. The UPDF deploys troops to maintain good relations with the U.S. and other western nations. Uganda’s and Rwanda’s role in the DRC will be examined and evaluated on the extent to which the UPDF’s presence in the DRC was actually detrimental to the Congolese people. Another chapter will explore UPDF operations in southern Sudan and cooperation between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (“SPLA”) and the current status of relations between them. The deployment of Ugandan soldiers to Somalia as part of the African Union peacekeeping team is the most recent example of UPDF international involvement. This study will examine the motivations for being involved in such peacekeeping efforts and share the feelings and opinions of Ugandans on the Somalia matter. Finally, this paper will address the current level of worry and dissatisfaction with the UPDF among the Ugandan population. This analysis will include interviews with both current and retired UPDF members, members of the Ugandan government, and members of Ugandan society from all walks of life. It will also include data from a survey conducted over a ten-month period in Uganda. Finally, the reader will see that the UPDF’s international involvements have been anything but noble and that the entire UPDF needs to be re-evaluated and changed in order for Uganda to experience real democracy. The purpose of this paper is not to discredit or shame the many honorable and self-sacrificing Ugandan men and women who serve their country with the best and most dignified of intentions. Rather, it is a call to the top leadership of the UPDF and to the leadership of the GoU to give Ugandans what they deserve and treat the UPDF for what it needs to be, a national army, not what it is, a personal army of a dictator. The UPDF is and will be the cause of future instability within Uganda.

African Union

Abstract: This article explores Uganda’s decision to send peacekeeping troops to Somalia in 2007 as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and argues that the intervention has as much to do with Uganda’s relationship with its donors as it has with maintaining regional stability – the official justification for intervention. Museveni’s decision to intervene in Somalia is the most recent example of his regime’s multi-pronged ‘image management’ strategy in which the President has involved Uganda in numerous foreign and domestic activities to ensure that donors perceive his government in a particular way vis-à-vis their interests: as an economic success story, a guarantor of regional stability, or, in relation to Somalia, an ally in the global war on terror. In so doing Museveni’s strategy, conceptualized here within a constructivist frame-work, has been able largely to avoid censure in areas of traditional donor concern such as governance, thereby achieving a considerable degree of agency in a seemingly asymmetric relationship.

- “This analysis certainly chimes with the public and private statements of donor officials who have variously described their support for the regime in terms of Uganda’s ‘strong economic growth’ (1997), ‘solid economic growth’ (2009), important role ‘as a regional player’ (2009), and centrality in ‘counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa’ (2009). The officials have consistently depicted Uganda as a ‘star and…role model for other countries’ (2000), as a ‘beacon of hope throughout the region’ (1997), and as ‘a key regional ally in the GWOT’ (2005). Museveni himself has also been described as ‘a strong leader in solving regional conflicts’ (2008), a reliable ‘leader of regional initiatives’ (2009), and an individual who has ‘stepped up [in the GWOT] and done more than anyone else’ (2010).” P. 409

- “This suggests that other, more critical factors convinced the Museveni regime to involve itself in Somalia; the most plausible candidate for the additional motivation to intervene in recent years in the government’s desire to manage its relations with the donor community.” P. 419


Abstract: Soldiers from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have sexually abused and exploited vulnerable Somali women and girls on their bases in Mogadishu, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Troop-contributing countries, the African Union (AU), and donors to AMISOM should urgently address these abuses and strengthen procedures inside Somalia to seek justice.

- “The AU soldiers, relying on Somali intermediaries, have used a range of tactics, including humanitarian aid, to coerce vulnerable women and girls into sexual activity. They have also raped or otherwise sexually assaulted women who were seeking medical assistance or water at AMISOM bases.”
Bell, Andrew M. "Military Culture and Restraint Toward Civilians in War: Examining the Ugandan Civil Wars." Security Studies, vol. 25, no. 3, 2016. ** could not get access but looked interesting **


Abstract: This article discusses how Uganda wants the funding of AMISOM to be reviewed as the EU talks about pulling back on funding due to other priorities. Uganda currently has one of the largest peacekeeping forces in Somalia, with 6,000 troops deployed since 2007. Museveni is particularly concerned with the shortage of funds to deal with refugee crisis the conflict has caused, the article states.

- No good notes


Abstract: Between 2003 and 2008 the African Union deployed peace operations involving approximately 15,000 soldiers to four states: Burundi, Sudan, the Comoros, and Somalia. This represented a huge change of tempo from its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity. It also raises important questions about how successful these operations have been, what challenges they raise for the union’s peacekeepers, and whether this tempo of operations is sustainable. This article addresses these questions by providing an overview of the African Union’s peace operations and then reflecting on some of the general conclusions that can be drawn from the organization’s first five years of peacekeeping.

- “Politically, AMIB became caught up in international differences over how best to resolve the civil war. In particular, the then South African Deputy President Zuma publicly questioned the Tanzanian and Ugandan role in supplying weapons to various factions (especially the CNDD-FDD) and objected to these states’ troops being deployed as part of AMIB.” P. 100
- “In August 2004, Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame announced that his “forces will not stand by and watch innocent civilians being hack to death like the case was here in 1994. If it was established that the civilians are in danger, than our forces would certainly intervene and use force to protect civilians.” Nigeria, on the other hand, initially agreed with the Sudanese government’s position that AU peacekeepers were only to use force in self-defense.” P. 103
- “The third debate about AMIS’s mandate came after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2004. The agreement’s security provisions gave AMIS what Kofi Annan called “a myriad of new and formidable tasks.” These included civilians protection, (potentially forcible) disarmament of parties that did not sign the agreement, as well as drawing all the maps of which parties controlled what areas. The AU also acknowledged that it was “acutely aware of the limitations of the capacity of AMIS to fulfil the onerous responsibilities for monitoring and verification under the DPA….To undertake the numerous tasks specified requires additional forces, improved logistics, and a more robust mandate.” P. 104
“Even at its peak, each AMIS peacekeeper would have needed to oversee approximately 62 square kilometers to cover the whole of Darfur, a region stretching for some 500,000 square kilometers (roughly the size of Spain). Its peacekeepers also confronted much larger indigenous armed forces: according to the best available estimates, roughly 40,000 to 45,000 government troops were operating in Darfur while the janjaweed forces were estimated to be between 10,000 and 20,000 strong. This meant AMIS was unable to offer genuine protection to the majority of Darfur’s citizens.” P. 104

“The final and in many ways the most fundamental problem that AMIS faced was the lack of a workable political settlement to end the war in Darfur. As a consequence its personnel were left trying to engage in wider peacekeeping tasks in the midst of a live war zone. Not only did this leave AMIS literally caught in the cross-fire but it started to be seen as another participant in the war rather than as a facilitator of peace. AMIS personnel started being fired on in early 2005 and suffered their first casualties in October that year.” P. 104

“AMISEC’s mandate was to monitor the elections, create a stable environment, and verify that the Comorian security forces were not involved in the electoral process. The force was also authorized to protect civilians “within the proximity of the polling stations.” To fulfill these tasks six African states provided just over 400 troops.” P. 106

“In practice, nothing like the envisaged 8,000 troops actually turned up. Indeed, the AU struggled to secure promises of just over half that number (1,800 from Uganda, 1,600 from Burundi, 850 from Nigeria, 350 from Ghana, and an unknown number from Malawi). Until December 2007 when a company of 100 Burundian soldiers arrived, Uganda was the only country to deploy soldiers to AMISOM.” P. 109

“Once on the ground in Mogadishu, the Ugandan members of AMISOM engaged in several activities. First, they helped keep open the city’s airport and port. Second, they helped to provide protection for the president and prime minister of the TFG...Initially at least, speculation was rife that the Ugandan troops had worked out a quid pro quo with the insurgents along the lines of “we won’t attack you if you don’t attack us.” As the al-Shabaab grew in power, however, this deal began to break down. This left the AU peacekeepers unable to move freely around the city and facing mines and attacks on a regular basis.” P. 109

“First, the AU’s peace operations have been dependent on the participation of a small handful of key troop-contributing countries. This reflects the hugely uneven levels of support for peacekeeping across African states. Some countries have expended considerable effort trying to keep the peace in Africa.” P. 111

“A similarly mixed picture is evident when looking at contributions to the AU peace operations discussed here. Most of them would not have been able to function without the contributions of a small group of committed African states, particularly South Africa (which was crucial to operations in Burundi and the Comoros), Rwanda, Nigeria, Senegal (which together provided the military backbone of the AMIS force), and Uganda (which stood alone in AMISON for nearly a year before Burundian troops arrived).” P. 112

“Not only have many African governments failed to invest sufficiently in previous peacekeeping operations, they are not even funding effective bureaucracies to manage existing peacekeepers or centers of excellence to train future ones. While the AU has an approximate staff of 700, by late 2008 only about 30 of these headquarters staff work on peace and security issues. In relation to training centers, although there are five
institutions that claim to be centers of excellence for peacekeeping training, almost all of them rely on foreign sponsorship, and all of them have serious practical limitations. As a result of these huge resource gaps, the AU’s operations have depended on external assistance, most notably from states with the European Union and NATO. This assistance has usually come in the form of classroom education, field training exercises, the provision of equipment, and support necessary to deploy African peacekeepers and their equipment into the theatre of operations.” P. 113

- “Although Article 4h of the AU Constitutive Act permits the union to intervene without host government consent in certain “grave circumstances,” to date, all of the AU’s peace operations have been conducted at the invitation of the de jure authorities. This reflects the continued priority given to regime over human security issues within the African society of states. As such, the governments concerned have been able to exercise significant influence over the terms of the mission mandate.” P. 113


Abstract: The African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) endured a difficult first 30 months of operations. Deployed into an active war-zone, it was not long before an international debate began to revolve around how the mission should be brought to an end. This article analyses the main challenges as well as the most important local and international dynamics that affected the operation. It concludes that AMISOM was an ill-conceived mission that attracted few serious political champions partly because of the dangerous environment in which it operated and partly because of its lack of stable funding and capabilities. The predictable results were a dangerously under-resourced operation that placed peacekeepers in harm’s way for morally and politically dubious reasons.

- “At the time that AMISOM was launched, the AU had shown no evidence that it could muster, deploy, fund or manage an 8000-strong peacekeeping operation while also conducting a mission in Darfur. Part of the reason why the AU could not find sufficient numbers of troops was that most African governments viewed the Somalia operation as too dangerous, too costly and unlikely to succeed.” P. 527


Abstract: This article explores the relations between the African Union and its member states. While there are improvements on the AU level with regard to the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture and the building of other institutions such as the Pan-African Parliament, it becomes apparent at the same time that on the state level governments are reluctant to engage in a deepening of the continental integration. Some countries even topple the integration process or undermine their own initiatives such as the African Peer Review Mechanism. This article examines this phenomenon, and labels the identified unwillingness to change the status quo a ‘culture of conservatism’. Four explanations are offered for such a ‘culture of conservatism’: lack of capacity, unwillingness to surrender sovereignty, national
leaders’ reluctance to cede power, and the greater importance of regional economic communities as compared to the AU.

- No good notes


Abstract: Most African countries got their flag independence in the 1960s. Soon thereafter, one after the other, the new states began falling into the hands of new military strongmen. Those lucky fell under one-party dictatorships. Democracy and rule of law became alien to the continent. Using the case study of East Africa, this paper asks what should be done to improve the situation in the continent. Many in the continent thought that the introduction of a multiparty political system in the 1990s would improve the situation. It did not happen. The same military juntas had traded military fatigues with designer suits and got themselves “elected” into the same offices they got in by force in the first place. Constitutions in Africa are not worth the paper they are written on. They are amended just like any other inferior law. This paper attempts to propose what could be done to make constitutions in Africa endure time and become more stable. It is being proposed that Africa needs to respect the main tenets of constitutionalism. These are rule of law, independence of judiciary and clear separation of powers in the state. These principles should be complemented by development of a culture of peace, respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, equal access of all citizens to the natural wealth and resources of the country, and limited leadership. As a model for constitutionalism, the East African region has nothing to offer to the continent.

- No good notes


Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War, sub-Saharan African states have substantially increased their participation in international peacekeeping operations in Africa. Their contributions have become highly valued and even facilitated by major powers. This article examines why certain African states might contribute more than others to peacekeeping. In particular, prominent arguments are considered about the primacy of regime security concerns and the dynamics of warlord politics in the foreign policymaking of African states, the economic incentives of peacekeeping, and the importance of African states' concerns over their state legitimacy and territorial integrity. First, this study investigates the possibility that peacekeeping might be utilized as a diversionary strategy to divert the attention of both an African state's military and major powers from a regime's misrule. Second, this study examines the extent to which financial and material assistance from donor states encourages poorer states to engage in peacekeeping. Third, the study investigates whether states with less legitimate and more arbitrary borders might have greater incentive to contribute to peacekeeping operations to promote the territorial status quo in Africa. Empirical evidence from a quantitative analysis across 47 states of sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2001 suggests that states that are poorer, with lower state legitimacy and lower political repression, participate more often in regional peacekeeping.
“Interestingly, African peacekeepers less often come from the most developed states such as South Africa, Namibia, and Botswana, but more often from poorer countries including Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Uganda.” P. 217

“In sum, I argue that the degree to which a state is at risk of internal conflict or secessionist movements due to low state legitimacy can explain the interest of state leaders to engage in regional peacekeeping.” P. 223

“As expected, Military size has a positive and significant coefficient of 3.95, suggesting that states with larger armed forces tend to deploy more peacekeepers.” P. 225

“Despite prominent exceptions, I do not find, however, that the most repressive African regimes are most likely to contribute to peacekeeping. While no significant relationship is found between degree of political repression and the size of peacekeeping contributions, I actually find that less repressive regimes are likely to participate in more different PKOs than more repressive regimes.” P. 226

“States with lower horizontal legitimacy – those whose borders suffocate multiple ethnic groups into single states or dismember ethnic groups across different states – seem to both participate in more PKOs and make larger troop contributions to PKOs.” P. 227

“However, interestingly, the size of a state’s military does not seem to predict the number of different PKOs in which a state will participate. While the sizes of contributions vary, there does not appear to be a significant difference in the likelihood of large and small states joining any given peacekeeping mission. Further, involvement in military conflict does not seem to be a consistent predictor of peacekeeping contributions. In fact, states with ongoing insurgencies, including Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda, have been reliable peacekeeping contributors. Also, states of British colonial heritage seem especially likely to be major contributors to peacekeeping.” P. 227


Abstract: The article focuses on assessing the ability of the African Union to perform the policy, peacekeeping and peacemaking roles within its conflict management doctrine and it also discusses whether African security problems may be more easily solved by the AU as an organization with a continental profile or by some other African organization on lower level. According to authors, the AU suffers from similar deficits as local regional organizations, which considerably restrict its efficiency and make the gap between AU’s security mandate and the sources for its achievement, but it manages to perform the conflict management activities to a far greater degree than any other African organization at a much lower level has ever managed. With regard to that, the authors suggest an ideal profile of an actor capable of solving Africa’s security problems in the form of the AU and its African Peace and Security Architecture representing a platform of equal cooperation of the Union with regional organizations and combining the advantages of both of these actors’ approach towards conflict management.

“From the African Union’s peacekeeping activity expressed by its peacekeeping operations, four general conclusions can be deduced. The first of them is the fact that these operations were heavily dependent on the limited number of contributing African states; on the one hand, it means a very diverse level of support for peacekeeping across
the continent, but on the other hand, it also reflects the preferences of member states concerning what organisations they will send their soldiers to. Despite the fact that the AU conducts its own peacekeeping activities, several African states, the most significant of which are Rwanda, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Benin, and Egypt, remain keen supporters of peacekeeping within the UN. Similarly, it can be said that a majority of the AU peacekeeping operations could have never been conducted without the contributions of a small number of devoted African countries, including above all South Africa (crucial for the operations in Burundi, the Comoros, and Darfur), Rwanda, Nigeria and Senegal (altogether forming the military axis of the African Union Mission in Sudan /AMIS/ forces, while Nigeria was also one of the main contributors to the African-led International Support Mission to Mali /AFISMA/ that was incorporated to MINUSMA in July 2013), and Uganda (standing alone for nearly a year in the African Union Mission in Somalia /AMISOM/ before the arrival of Burundi troops). Ethiopia also provided a great number of its soldiers to the African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and supported South Africa in the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB). Regarding the fact that the entire AU has 54 members, the aforementioned reality of contributors to peacekeeping missions leaves a great space to expansion.

- The second general conclusion is the persisting dependence of AU peacekeeping operations on non-African assistance coming especially from the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. It is interesting to point out that this dependence undermines the key rhetoric principle of the Union’s approach to conflict management, which is giving preference to African solutions (according to the well-known slogan “African solutions first”).

- As regards the personnel aspect, the AU suffers from a lack of military and civilian specialists, including doctors, police officers, engineers, intelligence agents and experts to build up local capacity in the fields of justice and law. However, the Union’s largest civilian deficit in conflict management is its lack of mediation capacity.

- The third conclusion of the AU’s peacekeeping activity is the evident difficulty to reach the consensus of the member states on the mandate of peacekeeping operations, and this is so especially if the host state should be a PSC member or if the host state has an ally in the Council willing to support its position. In general, it is related to the issue of the degree of commitment of Union members to the idea of humanitarian intervention and in particular to Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU.

- The last fourth conclusion that can be reached about Union’s peacekeeping operations is that they have always been constructed (perhaps with the exception of the mission on the Comoros) as temporary provisions counting on a prompt overtaking of the peacekeeping relay by the UN.

- As a continental body, AU can better represent African security interests in the global field.

- The aforementioned goes hand in hand with the fact that the criticized approach is based on a rather misleading description of conflict management initiatives in Africa. Perhaps the most important misinterpretation of reality relates to the weakening role of the UN and unshakable faith that Africa will build up forces that will make the UN on this continent redundant. The ASF was hoped to be operational in 2008, this was gradually extended, but the Force is still not operational. The current aspiration is for 2015, but it is
not clear that this date will be met either. It is true that from the early 1990s up until now, the UN has been by far the most crucial actor engaged in the management of African conflicts and played a major role in the greatest and most severe peacekeeping operations on the continent.” P. 14


Abstract: Repeatedly called upon to provide soldiers to intervene in Africa’s numerous conflicts and potential flashpoints, the military forces of the African Union (AU) are frequently not up to the task. Factors working against the AU’s forces include ill-trained and ill-equipped armies, under-funded operations, disagreements over issues such as border demarcations among several of the AU nations, and linguistic and cultural barriers. Without strong AU military forces capable of providing effective interventions, many African conflicts will either remain unresolved or depend on forces outside the continent to attempt to impose a non-African solution on them.

- “There are inherent difficulties in attempting to create a cohesive force from widely disparate populations. Should a nation’s military choose only soldiers who speak the same language; numerous others will be disenfranchised, which can lead to internal dissent. On the other hand, it can be costly in both money and time to train and fully integrate a military force of different linguistic backgrounds.” P. 268
- “Language thus serves as both a barrier to communication among the nations who volunteer for peacekeeping missions, as well as to soldiers from various ethnic groups within each nation.” P. 268
- “Besides language, culture also comes into play when trying to forge a coalition of forces from different African nations. Religion, values, and traditions can all create numerous obstacles. These problems can range from supplying acceptable food to dealing with religions forbidding women to serve in the ranks. Though NATO troops certainly have their cultural differences, they do not appear to run nearly as deep as those present among the AU nations.” P. 269
- “At times the AU’s equipment is woefully inadequate for the task at hand. Soldiers of the AU Darfur Mission (AMIS) are armed with pistols for officers, AK-47’s for the majority of the troops, and one rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG-7) for every ten soldiers. When opposing unarmed civilians these weapons are quite adequate. However, against the factions armed by the government they are poorly equipped and little more than a “nuisance”. This imbalance in firepower helps explain how both an 18-man AMIS patrol and its 20-man rescue team were kidnapped by one of the factions fighting in West Darfur.” P. 269
- “If there were only one or two relatively small peacekeeping operations, perhaps the AU could meet their funding and manpower needs. However, with numerous African flashpoints needing peacekeepers, the finite number of adequately trained soldiers and small amount of available funds from a largely impoverished continent are quickly depleted.” P. 270
- “Even if there were a larger contingent of AU forces in Darfur, unreasonable Sudanese government restraints would continue to hamper their effectiveness. The overall mission of AMIS is to verify and monitor the ceasefire between the Government and rebel troops.
This mission is also to “protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the Government of Sudan.” Unfortunately, “a strict interpretation of this mandate does not allow AMIS to protect civilians from imminent attack unless the AMIS troops are present at that very moment. Even when AMIS knows an attack is coming, it is unable to react.” On 18 September 2005, villages in North Darfur were attacked. Not allowed to intervene, AMIS’s role was limited to investigating the aftermath.”

- “Many of the African nations that support an AU force have limited counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency capabilities. For nearly two decades the Ugandan army has fought the Lord’s Resistance Army, a rebel force dedicated to overthrowing the Ugandan government. Despite the government soldiers’ numerical superiority and a steady erosion of support for the Lord’s Resistance Army’s from their original backers, the Acholi in Northern Uganda, the Ugandan Army has not been able to eliminate this insurgency within its borders. Forces are spread too thinly, there is widespread corruption, and the enemy is skilled in guerilla warfare.”

- “South Africa, which provides soldiers to numerous peacekeeping missions and arguably has the best-trained military in Africa, has a 23 percent HIV/AIDS rate among its soldiers. 27 Soldiers who are HIV positive will either be excluded from peacekeeping missions, thereby reducing further the pool of available military personnel, or will serve but become gradually ineffective.”

- “The human rights records of some of the militaries that constitute the AU forces are abysmal. Uganda for example has soldiers in Somalia as part of an AU peacekeeping force. In 2005, the World Court placed a ten billion dollar judgment against Uganda for its intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Upon examining the evidence, the court found that during Uganda’s five-year occupation of eastern portions of the DRC, they tortured and killed civilians.”

- “With so many shortages – properly trained troops, funds, modern equipment, intelligence capabilities – the AU frequently places its soldiers in harm’s way, accepting risks that other multinational forces, such as NATO, might not find acceptable. Peacekeeping is rarely, if ever, risk free, but there has to be a reasonable chance that the operation will succeed with minimal casualties, and unfortunately that is not always true with AU missions.”


Abstract: Between 2003 and 2008 the African Union deployed peace operations involving approximately 15,000 soldiers to four states: Burundi, Sudan, the Comoros, and Somalia. This represented a huge change of tempo from its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity. It also raises important questions about how successful these operations have been, what challenges they raise for the union’s peacekeepers, and whether this tempo of operations is sustainable. This article addresses these questions by providing an overview of the African Union’s peace operations and then reflecting on some of the general conclusions that can be drawn from the organization’s first five years of peacekeeping.
- “Spurred on by international calls to “do something” in response to the civilian suffering evident in Darfur, the AU expanded AMIS in a series of phases. On October 20, 2004, it authorized an increase in the number of AMIS personnel to 3,320. In April 2005, this number was expanded to more than 6,000 troops and 1,560 civilian police. This further expansion came after the AU acknowledged that its force was “extremely stretched to implement its mandate.”27 It also recognized that in spite of its efforts “the number of people displaced and at risk in Darfur has doubled since last year and continues to rise.”” p. 102

- “AMIS also faced major problems because of its lack of resources. This left it unable to fulfill numerous aspects of its mandate. First, it lacked sufficient numbers of troops to monitor the whole of Darfur. Even at its peak, each AMIS peacekeeper would have needed to oversee approximately 62 square kilometers to cover the whole of Darfur, a region stretching for some 500,000 square kilometers (roughly the size of Spain). Its peacekeepers also confronted much larger indigenous armed forces: according to the best available estimates, roughly 40,000 to 45,000 government troops were operating in Darfur while the janjawid forces were estimated to be between 10,000 and 20,000 strong. This meant AMIS was unable to offer genuine protection to the majority of Darfur’s citizens.” P. 104

- “Indeed, the AU struggled to secure promises of just over half that number (1,800 from Uganda, 1,600 from Burundi, 850 from Nigeria, 350 from Ghana, and an unknown number from Malawi).59 Until December 2007 when a company of 100 Burundian soldiers arrived, Uganda was the only country to deploy soldiers to AMISOM. This prompted the AU Commissioner Alpha Konare to criticize his organization’s member states for failing to honor their pledges of troops.” P. 109

New Militaries (East African Standby Force)


Abstract: Three critical trends in the evolving practice of regional peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa have undermined the usefulness of the common conceptual dichotomy between regional peacekeeping and UN/global peacekeeping. First, sub-Saharan African states have distanced themselves from long-term autonomous regional peacekeeping, and currently favour explicitly interim missions that are a prelude rather than an alternative to UN peacekeeping. Second, the analytically clear line between regional peacekeeping and the separate sub-Saharan African tradition of solidarity deployments (i.e. military support of embattled governments) has in practice become blurred, and the regional vs global peacekeeping dichotomy not only fails to acknowledge this trend but helps to obscure it. Finally, sub-Saharan African states are increasingly addressing regional conflicts by participating in UN operations deployed in the region. UN peacekeeping has thus emerged as a preferred form of regional peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa.

- “Among the most recent initiatives is the African Union’s (AU’s) creation of the continental African Standby Force (ASF), which was formally established in July 2002
and was due to become functional in 2010, though its operationalization has been delayed.” P. 518
- “ECOMOG, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group deployed to end Liberia’s civil war, was hobbled by resource constraints and suffered from limited local and international legitimacy, but it responded to a crisis ignored by the UN, grew to include over 12,000 troops, and was sustained despite heavy human and financial costs. It thus set a precedent for conceiving of African regional peacekeeping as sub-regional, robust, and controversial.” P. 520
- “There have been two crucial developments. First, continental peacekeeping has emerged as a significant form of regional peacekeeping…These missions often depended heavily on large troop contributions from particular African states, notably South Africa (in Burundi and Comoros), Uganda (in Somalia), and Nigeria and Rwanda (in Sudan). Nevertheless, they elicited more widespread participation than sub-regional operations, in the sense of attracting at least some troops/military observers from a wide variety of sub-Saharan African states.” P. 522
- “AU missions also enjoyed considerable international legitimacy and global support, replacing sub-regional organizations as the primary focus of international attention.” P. 522
- “At the continental level, the AU has been severely hampered by the limited resources that its members were able and willing to contribute to its missions, and has emerged as unable to sustain effective long-term peacekeeping operations.” P. 523
- “The prospect of sustained continental peacekeeping has not been entirely abandoned. Notably, the ASF could technically be deployed for longer-term missions. The Force is projected to include substantial military capabilities, consisting of five sub-regional stand-by brigades compromising almost 4,300 troops each, with integrated command units and force enablers such as engineering, logistics and medical units, supported by sub-regional training and logistic systems.” P. 524
- “The AU has not met its target of achieving a fully operational ASF by June 2010, and has announced a new deadline of December 2015. It is not yet clear how it plans to overcome the remaining obstacles for operationalizing the ASF. It is also notable that a December 2010 AU briefing paper recommended ‘coordination of Mission support requirements with the UN…because deployment of the ASF is predicated on handing over to the UN’, suggesting that at least for some AU officials, transitional deployments remained a more likely scenario than long-term ones even for a fully operational ASF.” P. 525
- “By contrast, explicit recognition of solidarity deployments and regional peacekeeping as analytically distinct deployment types prompts analysts – and international policy makers – to empirically evaluate the balance of solidarity and peacekeeping characteristics in individual cases. It also enables a better understanding of the often-lamented biases in African peacekeeping, which frequently reflect not an insufficient understanding of peacekeeping principles, but a continued commitment to the principles of solidarity deployments.” P. 531

Abstract: In December 2014, countries contributing to the East African Standby Force (EASF) conducted the last exercise to test the validity of the functioning of the force. The exercise heralded the full operationalisation of the force. This article discusses the attainment of full operational capability (FOC) of the EASF, one year before the full operationalisation of the African Standby Force. The main conclusion is that whilst the attainment of FOC of the force should be celebrated with the member states actually validating their troops and equipment contributions, there are outstanding challenges including ongoing crises in the region and lack of resources among others that it must overcome before it can actually be deployed in a conflict situation.

- “It should be recalled that the attainment of the Full Operational Capability (FOC) of the African Standby Force (ASF), which was first mooted for the year 2008, was first pushed to 2010, and again to the end of 2015. The ASF is to comprise five standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components based in their respective countries and ready for fast deployment in conflict zones anywhere in Africa and possibly even outside the continent. Of the five regions, it is only East and West Africa regions that currently have their forces ready.” P. 2

- “As crises engulf the countries of the greater Horn of Africa region, it becomes imperative that the EASF begins operating. In this regard, the EASF member states have pledged forces and equipment towards the final establishment of the force.” P. 2

- “In general, in establishing the ASF, the AU intends to achieve more in terms of integrating African defence forces and reducing the overall costs that individual African countries have to bear on many African peacekeeping operations.” P. 3

- “According to a senior official at Uganda’s RDC, Uganda is one of only three countries that have an operational RDC among those contributing to the EASF.” P. 7

- “On 16 December 2013, the Government of South Sudan requested Uganda in stabilizing the situation in the country. On 19 December 2013, Uganda deployed troops of the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) to South Sudan. Uganda’s intervention was a unilateral military undertaking by the government. Neither the regional nor the international communities sanctioned the intervention. Uganda’s intervention in the South Sudan conflict has raised critical reviews, with some regional countries like Ethiopia questioning the UPDF’s participation in the fighting. According to a senior UPDF officer, Uganda should have intervened in South Sudan under the EASF arrangement, thus making the deployment more credible and legal.” P. 10


Abstract: Attitudes towards a regional military force are of paramount importance when exploring public support for regional integration. Until now, however, scholarly research has not considered the influence of attitudes towards a regional military mechanism in the sub-Saharan African context. Using Afrobarometer data, we demonstrate that military concerns are vital when exploring Tanzanian attitudes towards the proposed political federation of the East African
Community (EAC), the East African Federation (EAF). More specifically, opposition to military cooperation strongly influences Tanzanian scepticism of the EAF. This finding is highly relevant given that referendums in the participating member states must be passed to facilitate political integration. Heightened opposition towards military cooperation raises the possibility of the public rejecting a politically integrated EAC. This poses a potential obstacle to the implementation of joint security policies and crucial mechanisms to provide a more stable region at large. We account for alternative explanations of Tanzanian opinion formation and reflect on the strength of military-orientated concerns for investigating public support for the East African project specifically and regional integration in sub-Saharan Africa more widely.

- “The joint defence forces of the EAC partner states is another prominent aspect of East African integration. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in Defence Matters was signed in 1998 and revised in 2001. Under the MoU, partner states have successfully pursued various activities: building confidence among defence forces, developing and testing standard operating procedures for operations in peacekeeping, and developing strategies for disaster management and counterterrorism.” P. 259

- “The EAC provides a particularly useful case for testing (EU-generated) military-related determinants of citizen attitudes since – in contrast to many regional communities across the globe, which are explicitly based on economic criteria – the EAC considers joint defence and security as crucial to integration progression. Indeed, providing a peaceful and stable environment in the East African region is perceived as crucial to achieving the economic (customs union, common market, monetary union) and political objectives of the EAC.” P. 267


Abstract: Ten years after its endorsement by the un General Assembly, the operationalization of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) concept faces challenges of consistency and capacity. Too often, global politics at the world’s premier intergovernmental body, the un, hampers effective action. Regional arrangements have a crucial role to play in this regard, however, questions of capacity to live up to this expectation remain. The Peace and Security Council (psc) of the African Union (au), mandated to implement the African Peace and Security Architecture (apsa) has primarily focused on developing the African Standby Force (asf), which the au succeeded in bringing to its ‘Full Op-erational Capability’ (foc) in December 2015 for implementation. Deploying the asf in deserving cases, for instance in Burundi in 2016, raises issues of sovereign consent, risks and costs. To avoid these complexities, this article argues that regional arrangements under Chapter viii are primarily pacific tools of the Security Council; focusing on harnessing these peaceful mechanisms of conflict prevention offers potential for consistent and effective ‘first responses’ to crises, with fewer complications. Regional arrangements as mediation tools present great opportunity for peaceful settlement of local disputes. Support for mediation is typically by peace operations. This article proposes that mediation support by a ‘preventive arbitration’ tool through ‘popular participation’ under the African Governance Architecture (aga) may have a pivotal role in this respect. Therefore, a regional responsibility to protect, through greater mediation, requires mediating challenges of governance in Africa.
Abstract: The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a watershed in African security – a truly multinational, all African, peace support operation. While there will be many strategic, operational, and tactical lessons to be drawn from this experience, one that is already yielding changes within African military forces is the awareness of the need for effective civil-military operations (CMO) to complement other components of the campaign. Not only are the AMISOM leaders and units adapting on the ground, the troop-contributing countries (TCC) are implementing changes in their organizations and training programs at home. For the “tactician” in global security, this poses interesting questions regarding the operational role of CMO and its impact on regional security; strategically, it is important to evaluate how this increased awareness of CMO is driving changes in East African armed forces and the implications for civil-military relations in all the countries involved.

- Problems regularly follow military troops deployed in populated areas for extended lengths of time: discipline, insubordination, human rights abuses and corruption among others. The locals tolerate this as little from foreign troops as from domestic soldiers.” P. 118
- “Where the Kenyan Defense Forces have focused on the engineering side of CMO, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) has taken a broader view of CA capabilities. This may be due to a longer and more varied history of CMO, including UPDF support to relocating large numbers of civilians from areas taken over by Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) into Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps and their subsequent repatriation after Kony’s departure from Uganda. Additionally, the Ugandan military has participated in the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), a mission focused on cooperation and coordination due to the existence of a functioning government in Khartoum and the large number of international organizations and NGOs. Lastly, the UPDF is one of the earliest and largest troop contributors to AMISOM.” P. 126
- “U.S CA teams from CJTF-HOA have been working with the UPDF in the Karamoja Region of Eastern Uganda since June 2009, aiming to help the UPDF gain the acceptance and trust of the civilian population and enhance security. Prior to Karamoja, U.S teams conducted projects in Kitgum and Gulu.” P. 126-7
- “News reports in the Karamoja region intermittently reported bad behavior by UPDF soldiers towards civilians, but some NGOs claimed that the U.S. military teams working with the UPDF helped add credibility and legitimacy to the UPDF teams in the homeland. The Ugandans, much as the Kenyans, are showing considerable proactive concern for training and improving their track record and image, and learning from the international community.” P. 127
- “The UPDF are in the process of streamlining and crafting the structure, but are hampered by budget restraints and implications. They are carrying out training at operational and tactical levels which has reportedly already improved their forces and operations in the Somalia mission as well as in the Central African Republic, where the
UPDF is pursuing the LRA, all in addition to the CIMIC operations in Karamoja where the UPDF are continuing their “disarmament operations.”” p. 128

““In the past decade, the UPDF and the KDF’s emphases were primarily on domestic missions, though this is changing rapidly due to the Somalia mission.” P. 129


Abstract: This paper traces briefly the efforts undertaken by African states through the African Union (AU) to find a common African security policy that envisages the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF). The paper then goes on to discuss East African countries’ efforts to establish an Eastern Africa standby brigade, in line with the requirements of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). The need for a common African defence and security policy was stressed during the Inaugural Summit of the AU held in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, when the Assembly of Heads of State and Government deliberated the proposal of Libyan leader that Africa establishes a single continental army. The African leaders were also motivated to respond to the multifaceted challenges to stability, security and cooperation on the continent. It is in this context that the Constitutive Act of the AU in Article 4(d) calls for the establishment of a common defence policy for the African continent.


Abstract: This study examines the roles, challenges and prospects of Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) in the maintenance of peace and security in the Eastern Africa. Findings of the study show that EASF has limited role in maintaining peace and security in the region. It has played only some supportive roles to the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) peace support missions. This minimal role is due to hegemonic competition between Ethiopia and Kenya, the prevalence of several interstate and intrastate conflicts in the region, duplication of regional organizations having overlapping membership, absence of strong legal basis, lack of adequate finance, and cultural diversity. Notwithstanding those challenges, EASF has a good future prospect as can be observed from its current activities. The organization is working to achieve its full operationalization. To this end, it has also been conducting pre-deployment joint trainings and field exercises. For more successful future operation of the force, however, the study suggests cooperation among member states, developing unfettered commitment of member states to contribute force, finance and logistics as well as standardizing training and doctrines so as to create effective multinational forces.


Abstract: This article traces the origins and current status of the Eastern Africa Standby Force
Adams. Annotated Bibliography on Militarization in East African

(EASF). The EASF traces its origins to an Organisation of African Unity (OAU) experts’ group meeting in October 1997. Despite the 2010 announcement of initial operational capability, there are continued weaknesses in funding, main-tenance support, availability of personnel, training, and logistics. From 2007, various measures were initiated to increase reaction speed via nationally provided rapid deployment capabilities. Given the problems of generating multinational capability, this appears a sound decision. Because of the protracted period multinational capability generation takes, rapid deployment capacities will for the foreseeable future be the only readily deployable force. The concept as a whole appears insufficiently adapted for Eastern Africa’s current political and military situation. The final recommendations in this paper are thus focused on maximizing the value of the work already invested in the African Standby Force (ASF) while, at the same time, adapting Western peace support practices and doctrine in ways that are more suitable for African conditions.

- “The UK proposed that Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, and Kenya each consider a single nation standby high readiness battle group. By 2012 the UK aspiration for rapid deployment capabilities in Eastern Africa had become ‘an operational level HQ, able to command different units and capabilities’, with police and civilian advisers. The crisis establishment of the Kenya and Uganda rapid deployment capabilities are about 1,700-1,900 in total, while it appears that the Rwanda rapid deployment capability’s establishment may be smaller than that range.” p/ 27

- “The Ugandan Rapid Deployment Capability Centre ‘doesn’t yet have a full staff allocated’, but is directed by a two-star, Maj.-Gen. Francis Okello. The more senior rank of the commandant appears to be because the headquarters is responsible for several other functions beyond the rapid deployment capacity task itself. This reflects ‘an army that has five current operations and that is badly overstretched’. Some of the other Uganda Rapid Deployment Capability (URDC) tasks include following up on AMISOM military lessons learned, and natural disaster response. UK spending on the Uganda rapid deployment capability since 2008 was US$1.72 million as of August 2012.” P. 27

- “In addition, Eastern Africa is disadvantaged compared to the Western and Southern regions, whose members are both contiguous with their respective Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and have clear regional hegemons, resulting in less sparring over regional leadership.” P. 28-9


Abstract: The quest for a sub-regional standby force for the Horn of Africa was not only timely but also indicative of the willingness of the international community to invest in regional organizations with a view to enhancing their role in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) was established as a component of an African standby military capability. The implications of such military cooperation for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the sub-region cannot be overstated. This essay presents a cautious defence of regional efforts to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. If EASBRIG is adequately supported by the international community and the will of sub-regional countries, it has the potential to create and enhance intergovernmental response to conflicts, thereby contributing to regional peace, and to the promotion and protection of human rights.
“Uganda has dedicated a centre of excellence for the training of EASBRIG troops. That brigade would have to come from a group of countries that have been working together to develop common training and equipment standards, common doctrine, and common arrangements for the operational control of the force. The command of the brigade would rotate annually, and in alphabetical order, among member states.” P. 175

**Africa Command**


Abstract: The recent establishment of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) embodies the resurgence of counterinsurgency arguments within the transformation of the US military. The command’s emphasis on its “non-traditional” character that includes civil activities, a focus on the population’s security, as well as its interagency approach intensified the controversy about the role of the military in US foreign policy. Rather than merely focusing on how to succeed in asymmetric warfare, AFRICOM proposes a long-term commitment of US forces in situations where violent conflict is not apparent and has to be prevented. This “proactive peacetime engagement” on the continent targets crucial communities and their perceptions through humanitarian and development projects. Africa is likely to become a testing ground for the US military’s expansion into “non-traditional” activities ranging from counterinsurgency to conflict prevention. Blending security and development in this radical way may make the distinction between civil and military intervention vanish.

- “Instead of directly participating in peacekeeping operations, the US favoured training African troops for such missions within the “African Crisis Response Initiative” which under George W. Bush developed into the “African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance.” Even though the continent’s relevance in political and humanitarian terms is acknowledged, by 1995 the Pentagon saw “very little traditional strategic interests” in Africa.” P. 566
- “The most prominently featured criticism was the failure to consult with the African partners prior to the establishment of the command. In fact, proponents of AFRICOM blame problems in presentation, communication and planning as having caused the public’s lukewarm reaction.” P. 569
- “Second, in October 2008, AFRICOM commander General William Ward had to make clear that “our mission is essentially military-to-military activity, but we can play a supportive role in humanitarian relief, disaster assistance and in other areas as may be requested and coordinated by our lead civilian agencies”.” P. 570
- “AFRICOM’s current activities include the naval operation “Africa Partnership Station” in which the countries in the Gulf of Guinea are trained to secure their waters and enabled to address piracy, drug trafficking, and arms smuggling. This programme has been expanded to East Africa.” P. 570

Abstract: On 6 February 2007, President George W. Bush ordered the Department of Defense to establish the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) as America’s sixth geographic unified combatant command by October 2008. However, unlike other commands that focus on fighting wars, the new structure was given a distinctly nonmilitary mission: “to enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa” by strengthening bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with African states and creating new opportunities to bolster their capabilities

- “Members of the Pan-African Parliament, the legislative organ of the African Union, passed a non-binding motion asking member governments “not to accede to the United States of America’s Government’s request to host AFRICOM anywhere in the African continent.”” P. 267


Abstract: US Department of Defense change agents pursued transformation in creating US Africa Command and focused inwardly to win the bureaucratic struggle. In contrast, they did not bother to consult with African leaders and made assumptions about African reactions to AFRICOM, which demonstrated a lack of empathy. The authoritarian leadership style of Rumsfeld brought about the unworkable directive that AFRICOM headquarters should be placed on the African continent in less than two years. The directive was rejected by most African leaders and media. A subsequent ‘strategic communications’ campaign to repackage AFRICOM and sell it to African leaders failed because of already established suspicions. Only the reversal of the directive to place the command on the continent brought grudging acceptance, along with American offers of training, joint exercises, and other forms of security assistance. At issue is the viability of AFRICOM in the face of Congressional scrutiny and the possibility that the new command will not be fully funded. Members of Congress have not been convinced that AFRICOM will advance American national interest.

- “In August 2006, as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was preparing to leave office, he gave orders for the creation of AFRICOM: ‘The command must be fully operational by October 2008 on the African continent.’ The new command would have ‘inter-agency structure and content’. The United States government failed to consult African leaders as AFRICOM was being conceived and created in the latter half of 2006.” P. 87

- “In Nigeria, the government and media were generally negative. An editorialist wrote, ‘It is gainsaying to mention that Africans will be seeing United States marines and soldiers more often than not’, and referred to President Bush as ‘an emerging Hitler whose primary motive is to extend his influence’.51 A second commentator called into question the security assistance role of the new command: ‘AFRICOM does not proffer answers to the growing tide of conflicts that inflict the beleaguered continent; rather it raises a lot of
queries.’52 A Nigerian commentator writing in a South African newspaper noted that the American failure to provide meaningful assistance to Liberia during its violent civil war belied any notion of a genuine altruistic intent.53 He continued that AFRICOM was evidence of neo-colonial ambitions.” P. 89

- “In September 2007, Theresa Whelan informed the press that ‘instead of saying war fighting is the primary mission of the command . . . we are saying the primary mission of this command is to focus on building security capacities in Africa’81 and ‘the primary objective is not to fight and win wars on the continent’.82 By using the terms ‘primary mission’ and ‘primary objectives’, Whelan implied that war-fighting was a mission and objective, albeit not a primary mission or objective, of AFRICOM.” P. 92

- “Significantly, once the United States decided not to base AFRICOM on the continent, Nigeria changed its stance and accepted AFRICOM.” P. 93


Abstract: With about 1,000 military bases on foreign soils, the U.S. accounts for over 95 percent of all foreign-based military bases worldwide. These bases, in return, cost the U.S. taxpayer at least 100 billion dollars annually to maintain and sustain. These include forward landing bases and small strategic islands from which indigenous communities have been forcefully removed or live under continuing oppression. In Africa and former colonized lands, most of these bases were acquired or leased at the peak of the anti-colonial independence wave. The almost constant consequence of these bases has been the displacement of the indigenous peoples, loss of livelihoods, environmental degradation, and massive human rights violations.

- “After initial denials of Africom’s involvement in the botched offensive, in the face of rising evidence, the Pentagon admitted that Africom had indeed provided technical, logistical, intelligence, and financial support to the joint U.S.–Ugandan operation. Beyond disrespect for territorial sovereignty, the casualties from the operation and retaliatory strikes by the dispersing LRA raised critical questions about human rights and the limits of interventionism. More, it exposed the risks of Africom emboldening aggressive regimes that have questionable democratic credentials.” P. 141


Abstract: This article explores the conjuncture that gave rise to the rush by the United States recall of the past role played by the US military in Africa, then moves to the current increased military intervention and partnership with some leaders in Africa of suspect democratic credentials. The author challenges the attempt by the US government commitment to peace on the continent, and urges a new global solidarity among all peace activists.

- “In the context of efforts to bring peace and stability to the regions of the Sudan plagued by war, there are reports by African peacekeepers of the duplicity of the EU and the US in relation to the deployment of AU peacekeeping forces in Darfur. While using technical
arguments to block support for the AU peacekeeping efforts, the US government has been tacitly supporting the campaign called ‘Save Darfur’, while ‘engaging’ the same military leadership that is said to be the architect of the genocide. Despite the formal transfer of authority from the AU-led peacekeeping force in Sudan (AMIS) to the hybrid UN/AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in December 2007, there has been very little support for the UN’s AU mission.” P. 19

- “On 29 August 2007 the Southern African Development Community (SADC) announced its position: it would be better if the US were involved with Africa from a distance, rather than being present on the continent.” P. 21
- “There has developed within Africa a widespread understanding that ‘peace with sexual violence is still war’. Tackling sexual and gender-based violence throughout the continent requires different thinking and action – very different from the kind of resources being mobilized for the US Africa Command. Already, in areas where US military personnel have been based, one of the byproducts of their presence has been an increase in sex trade and child prostitution. Child prostitution and the commercial exploitation of children has been one of the clearest byproducts of international humanitarian workers in Africa in the past two decades. Well-publicized cases of the abuse of children in war zones of Africa point to the widespread challenges of sexual terrorism.” P. 29


Abstract: This article discusses the lack of transparency AFRICOM has, and how there are far more bases on the African continent than AFRICOM will admit to. They ignore when reporters inquire about number of bases but many people have estimated it is up to 60 bases, when AFRICOM will claim they only have one in Djibouti. The article also discusses their use of drones, and their work in the last few years across the continent, including the building of more facilities and gaining more funding.

- AFRICOM has claimed to have one base on the continent, in Djibouti
- But there are actually many many more as stations and research facilities and warehouses
- 11 sites as outposts most coming post 9/11, cooperative security locations
- some estimate close to 60 though not all may be currently in use
- “Another CSL, mentioned in a July 2012 briefing by US Army Africa, is located in Entebbe, Uganda. From there, according to a Washington Post investigation, US contractors have flown surveillance missions using innocuous-looking turboprop airplanes.”
- “To supply its troops in East Africa, AFRICOM has also built a sophisticated logistics system. It’s officially known as the Surface Distribution Network, but colloquially referred to as the “new spice route.” It connects Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. These hubs are, in turn, part of a transportation and logistics network that includes bases located in Rota, Spain; Aruba in the Lesser Antilles; Souda Bay, Greece; and a forward operating site on Britain’s Ascension Island in the South Atlantic.”

Abstract: AFRICOM is the acronym for USAFRICOM, the United States Africa Command. Authorized by President Bush on 18 December 2006 and established as a temporary subunified command of US European Command (EUCOM) on 1 October 2007, with General William ‘Kip’ Ward as its commander, AFRICOM became a new, independent, fully autonomous and operational military command on 1 October 2008. Although many anthropologists, especially Africanists, will have heard of AFRICOM, few may be aware of its precise purpose, how it came into being and its relevance for our discipline, especially given recent attempts to militarize academia and politicize research.1 There are two dimensions to AFRICOM. One is the post-Cold War rationalization of America’s global military command structure; the other is the positioning of AFRICOM within the new ‘security-development’ discourse. While the first is readily comprehensible, the second enables AFRICOM to be portrayed as more benign than it really is. I will deal with the two aspects separately.

- “The Cheney Report highlighted the strategic importance of Africa, prompting Bush to define African oil as a ‘strategic national interest’ and hence a resource that the US might choose to control through military force” p.17
- “The establishment of AFRICOM reflects the Bush-Cheney administration’s primary reliance on the use of military force to pursue its strategic interests. The progressive militarization of Africa since 2002 has three serious consequences for the peoples of Africa. Firstly it will militarize US relations with Africa and militarize numerous African countries which, in turn, will be more likely to use force in obtaining their own objectives. Secondly, the presence of US bases and domestic governments’ encouragement to use force in preference to more democratic means will create more militants and hence unrest and insecurity, as we are seeing in most countries of North Africa and the Sahel. Thirdly, the US administration’s primary reliance on its military has effectively usurped the role of the State Department and specialized agencies such as USAID, whose skills and experience are better suited to achieving the ‘peace’, ‘security’ and ‘development’ that AFRICOM claims to espouse.” P. 19
- “AFRICOM is showing signs of serving to protect unpopular, repressive regimes supportive of US interests.” p. 19


Abstract: Frustration has been a leitmotif in the post-Cold War security landscape, especially regarding multinational peace building. The latest development in this landscape is the United States of America’s newly established ‘Africa Command’ (AFRICOM), a military command responsible for all US military activity in Africa. Although AFRICOM represents a shift in US strategy towards peace building, whether AFRICOM is good for Africa remains to be seen. Recognizing that AFRICOM is still at an embryonic stage, this briefing will broadly examine its origins, the US interests informing its mission, the key peace-building lessons learned it aspires to institutionalize, and finally some early challenges that will confront this nascent command.
- “If there is a single lesson learned for DoD in recent years, it is that security is a precondition of development and that the failure of development can result in insecurity. Accordingly, AFRICOM’s strategy for addressing African security challenges will rest heavily on security cooperation with African nations. In this vein, Ryan Henry and other senior DoD officials continually reiterate that, ‘The goal is for AFRICOM not to be a US leadership role on the continent but rather to be supporting the indigenous leadership efforts that are currently going on.’” P. 116

- “Security cooperation efforts to date are mainly limited to traditional ‘train and equip’ programmes, such as International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Financing, and Foreign Military Sales. However, the Pentagon is exploring new, more broad-reaching programmes, such as the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP), which links US states with African countries in order to enhance military capabilities, improve interoperability, and advance the principles of responsible governance.” P. 116


Abstract: The decision to create the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was more than an administrative change within the Department of Defense (DOD). It was the direct result of Africa’s increasing strategic importance to the U.S. and represents responsible officials’ recognition that the U.S. can no longer address the region’s unique security concerns by splitting responsibility among three independent combatant commands. American security priorities in Africa are distinct from those of other regions. As a result, AFRICOM differs from other combatant commands in both objectives and structure. The process of standing up the new command has been complicated and has involved a number of anticipated and unanticipated challenges. The command is projected to become fully operational this October. To be effective, AFRICOM must be adequately funded and robustly staffed so that it can coordinate with and incorporate expertise from other parts of the U.S. government. AFRICOM also will need to enhance its relationships with African governments and militaries. As the Africa Command stands up, Congress and the Administration need to work closely to ensure that these needs are addressed and that U.S. policy priorities do not suffer.

- As with other combatant commands, AFRICOM will conduct military operations to address U.S. national security priorities or respond to crises. Ideally, it would undertake these actions in conjunction with regional actors. AFRICOM is envisioned as more of a facilitator than a direct actor and is expected to focus on working with African governments and regional organizations to strengthen and enhance regional stability and security through military training, capacity building, and professionalization.

- U.S. security goals in Africa have less to do with traditional warfare than with helping to prepare and equip African governments and militaries to prevent conflict; deal with disease, insurgencies, and natural disasters; and participate in peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction more effectively. AFRICOM will also help to professionalize the continent's militaries, making them more accountable and effective.

Abstract: This brief article discusses David Rodriguez’s (Commander of AFRICOM) visit to East Africa, and the discussions that occurred about how AFRICOM can continue to help nations increase military capability. Also countries of the Northern Corridor, including Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda signed a mutual defense pact.

- Focus on issues of piracy, increased military patrols and defense pact


Abstract: This article discusses how the US continues to claim combat operations against al-Shabaab in Somalia as “self-defense strike”, even though some are clearly offensive in nature. The article outlines a few examples of AFRICOM’s strikes against al-Shabaab forces, and also gives a timeline of US operations against al-Shabaab since 2007.

- “AFRICOM’s attempts to mask direct combat operations against Shabaab targets such as training camps and IED factories as advise and assist missions whitewashes the more than 10-year-old war that the Somali government, the African Union, and the United States has waged against al Qaeda’s branch in Somalia. This year, AFRICOM announced nine “self-defense strikes” and “defensive fires” missions in Somalia. The Department of Defense has even justified airstrikes on Shabaab training camps, such as the one in Raso on March 5, 2016, as defensive operations.”


Abstract: Overall, although headlines portraying the African continent as the next al-Qaida front tend to over sensationalise the threat, Africa does offer a number of examples of the regionalisation of jihadism with religiously motivated groups such as Boko Haram or al-Shabab, feeding on local grievances and targeting the "near enemy" (as opposed to Osama Bin Laden's strategy of attacking the "far enemy").


Abstract: Current Western security doctrines assert that state fragility, radicalization and humanitarian disasters in the global South feed into ‘persistent conflict’. Such a scenario consequently requires a closely coordinated and integrated response from political and military actors. In this context, Western governments have introduced the concept of stabilization in their approaches to ‘fragile’ states. This article aims to understand the expanding activities of the US military in sub-Saharan Africa, which are conducted under the label of stability operations. It will be argued that the vast spectrum of activities under this label – from health projects to drone
attacks – can be made comprehensible through the concept of policing, understood as processes of regulating communities with the aim of establishing ‘good order’. Key pillars of the US military’s stability operations operations doctrine – namely, a focus on the welfare of the population (on a par with the minimum use of force) as well as an extended preventative engagement – overlap with concerns of police power. Presented by security strategists as vulnerable to instability, sub-Saharan Africa has become an experimental ground for the US military, where ideas on stability operations are tested. Empirically, the article discusses two manifestations of stability operations that warrant an analysis through the concept of policing: US Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) civil affairs projects and the US military’s active involvement in ongoing conflicts.

- “The spectrum of AFRICOM’s activities is so vast that it constitutes a challenge to map. Even though there is only one official US military base on the continent, different components of the command engage in a vast array of different practices. For example, they provide military-to-military training programmes for African militaries or multinational peacekeeping forces; support security sector reform; fight terrorists through covert action and drone attacks; deploy special operations forces; set up a network of operating locations and a vast logistics network; do aerial surveillance missions; engage in community outreach activities; set up a network of operating locations, including warehouses and airstrips that facilitate the command’s logistics; and engage in health, education and other development programmes across Western and Eastern Africa.” P. 127

- “With the aim of supporting the Ugandan government in its fight against the rebels of the LRA, US President Barack Obama, in October 2011, sent 100 so-called military advisors to Eastern and Central Africa (Obama, 2011). These units are dispersed on bases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic and Uganda (Whitlock, 2012a). The active support of the US military in capturing the LRA’s leader, Joseph Kony, adds a moral justification for AFRICOM’s very operations and additionally legitimizes any actions of the Ugandan military in this region. Rights activists in northern Uganda raise concern that, with the arrival of combat-equipped special forces in the conflict, a military solution to a conflict that has been going on since the late 1980s has once more become the only legitimate one.” P. 129


Abstract: Changes in the global strategic environment are increasing the importance of Africa to the United States. Terrorism, a rise in violent extremism, piracy, smuggling, and the second- and third-order effects of the Arab Spring present challenges to U.S., and indeed global, interests in Africa. The U.S. military is playing an increasingly important role in addressing these challenges and achieving U.S. aims on the continent. The purpose of this article is to provide a perspective on U.S. military approaches and how they nest within a whole-of-government approach that seeks to reinforce ongoing African security initiatives. The article concludes with challenges the U.S. military faces in effectively operating in Africa and possible ways to increase the chances of success.
“Today, an increasing number of African countries are developing professional militaries and contributing to effective regional forces. Uganda, Senegal, Kenya, Nigeria, and Ethiopia are just a few examples of countries taking a lead in regional efforts to address various complex security problems and transnational threats that are beyond the capability of any one government to address.” P. 326

“Today, an increasing number of African countries are developing professional militaries and contributing to effective regional forces. Uganda, Senegal, Kenya, Nigeria, and Ethiopia are just a few examples of countries taking a lead in regional efforts to address various complex security problems and transnational threats that are beyond the capability of any one government to address.” P. 326

“To advance regional peace and security, AFRICOM focuses on three functional areas: (1) countering violent extremist organizations (VEOs); (2) supporting maritime security and countering illicit trafficking; and (3) strengthening African defense capabilities.” P. 327

Jonathan Fisher


Abstract: This article explores the influence of actors and organisations outside the corridors of power in Washington, DC on US ‘crisis foreign policy making’ in Africa. Focusing on the case of US policy towards the LRA/northern Uganda crisis – particularly the Obama administration’s 2011 decision to send ‘combat-equipped US forces’ to pursue the rebel group across central Africa – it is argued that the role of African governments themselves merits greater consideration. The decision to send in these ‘military advisers’ was arguably strongly influenced by campaigns run by Western policy institutes, notably the International Crisis Group, and US advocacy groups since around 2007. The Ugandan regime of Yoweri Museveni has – it is suggested – nevertheless itself fundamentally shaped the nature and direction of the debate into which such groups have entered. This raises crucial questions about the agency of African governments in Western ‘crisis’ decision-making fora.

“Crucially, however, the actions of the UPDF and Ugandan government have also contributed significantly to the suffering of northern Ugandans. Allegations of human rights abuses and other atrocities committed against civilians by the UPDF during its campaigns against the LRA were rife during the 1990s, as have been accusations levelled more recently by a range of domestic and international actors and commentators that Kampala has purposefully and consistently failed to put an end to the conflict for a variety of political, strategic and foreign policy reasons.” P. 690

During initially promising peace talks with the rebel movement between 1993 and 1994, for example, Museveni frequently undermined the work of mediator Betty Bigombe by pressing for humiliating terms to be imposed on the LRA, whereas Bigombe sought a more comprehensive and realistic negotiation of a settlement.25 Indeed, in February 1994 the Ugandan leader attempted to force the group’s hand by threatening a return to hostilities if it did not surrender unconditionally; an action which ended the peace talks.” P. 691

Since around 2009, however, Resolve has, alongside Enough, Invisible Children, the ICG, Human Rights Watch and others, argued strongly for continued US support for Ugandan soldiers pursuing the rebel group.46 Indeed, Human Rights Watch made privately clear to US officials as early as January 2008 that it was “supportive” of the US-
assisted regional operation against the LRA in the aftermath of the Juba talks’ collapse.” P.693
- It remains an open question, however, why the White House decided, in the aftermath of Juba, to focus so heavily on emphasising the military option and on strengthening and supporting the UPDF – whose territory was no longer stalked by the LRA – in this regard.” P. 695
- In Uganda’s case the Museveni regime has adopted a range of strategies since 1987 – outlined below – aimed at managing international access to, and understandings of, the LRA crisis. These have invariably sought to emphasise the centrality of Kony as the sole cause of the conflict and the necessity of Ugandan-led military operations against the rebel group as the only viable solution to the crisis. Although this has not been a formal, comprehensive information management scheme, these different strategies have strongly complemented one another and brought about a situation whereby analysts and policy makers in Washington by 2009 broadly viewed the crisis through the same lens as the Ugandan government.” P. 697
- stead been forced to discuss this through the lens of counter-LRA policy.78 In its engagement with senior US policy makers the Museveni regime has also sought to ensure that such discussions remain security- and militaryfocused. The Ugandan leader, together with other senior officials, has focused his diplomatic interactions with senior US counterparts around discussing security matters and regional military activities and not humanitarian or governance affairs.” P. 698


Abstract: In the wake of 9/11, the politics of western aid and international development in general have become ‘securitized’ and ‘militarized’, most especially in those areas that are considered ‘hot spots’ in what has been called the ‘global war on terror’.1 Despite differing interpretations of what this process entails, there appears to be widespread agreement on two related issues: rst, that ‘securitization’ has had an unwelcome and negative impact on key development areas, such as social development, human rights and governance reform; second, that the security agenda of the global war on terror has been devised and promoted by western actors imposing a securitized approach upon passive and vulnerable states in the South. This article offers a corrective to both of these arguments by focusing on the role of governments in Africa that have eagerly embraced the securitization agenda, actively promoting its practice.

- “The Ethiopian and Ugandan regimes have also made extensive use of western security initiatives since the 1990s to build militarized, strongly authoritarian states. In both cases, authoritarianism has not diminished but has grown over time, providing further support for the ‘illiberal state-builders’ thesis. In Uganda, the relatively free press and ‘broad-based’ approach to government of the 1990s has given way to a more restrictive, personalized and autocratic regime which relies on corruption and military force to maintain power.” P. 137-8
- “Western support for both states’ security forces has been extensive and sustained since the early 1990s. The United States in particular has been a major provider of training and logistical support, as well as weaponry. Direct operational support is both covert and
public, including the Frontline States Initiative, the East African Counterterrorism Initiative, African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) and the Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA). This assistance has been particularly linked to Uganda’s fight against domestic rebel movements (notably the Lord’s Resistance Army, LRA)...” p. 138

- “Since the later 2000s, Washington has supported Museveni’s struggle against the LRA, dispatching 100 military advisers to assist Ugandan troops in 2010, and has given strong support to the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), in which Uganda’s army is playing the leading role and which greatly furthers Ethiopian interests. Recent US defence packages bound for Kampala have even included the supply of drone aircraft to Ugandan forces for use against Islamists in Somalia.” P. 138


Abstract: This article explores the role of international ‘donors’ in the lead-up to the 2011 Ugandan elections, focusing particularly on their engagement with the issue of Electoral Commission partiality. Controversially reappointed without consultation in 2009 by Uganda’s President, Yoweri Museveni, the Ugandan Electoral Commission was perceived as unacceptably pro-government by opposition parties, civil society and donors. Its seven commissioners’ administration of the 2011 polls cast a shadow of illegitimacy over the process long before the results were declared. This study attempts to explain why donors ultimately drew back from taking a ‘political’ (as opposed to a ‘technical’) approach to the matter in their dealings with the Museveni regime, in spite of their willingness to do so elsewhere (including in Nigeria) and with regard to other areas of disagreement with Kampala. It is argued that three major factors led donors to take the inconsistent and ineffective approach(es) they did: competing foreign policy priorities (particularly in relation to security Somalia and trade oil); the internal politics of the donor community; and an arguably misplaced perception, in the minds of many donor officials, that their missions did not possess sufficient influence over the regime to alter its stance on the issue. The findings of this study, it is suggested, are of broader relevance for policy-makers and scholars, particularly in the fields of democratization and international development.

- No good notes


Abstract: This article explores the role of perceptions in donor-African relations and the extent to which donor ‘images’ of African governments can be managed by these same governments to their advantage. The article focuses on donor views of ‘reliability’ in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and compares differing international perceptions of Kenya and Uganda through this lens. Arguing that donors have an exaggerated sense of Ugandan ‘compliance’ or reliability and Kenyan unreliability in fighting terrorism, it explains this by examining the two governments’ international ‘image management’ strategies, or lack thereof. The analysis contends that
Uganda’s success at promoting itself as a major donor ally in the GWOT, compared with Kenya’s general reluctance to do the same, has played a significant role in building and bolstering these differing donor perceptions. This, the article suggests, raises important questions about the nature of African agency in the international system.

- In many respects, therefore, Uganda and Kenya are in possession of quite similar records of cooperation with donors over GWOT issues. In general, however, the Museveni regime has been able to ‘deliver’ results more comprehensively than the Kibaki government owing to the former’s greater control of domestic legislative and security institutions (see below). It is clear, however, that donors (particularly the US and UK— the primary bilateral partners of both states) have drawn much starker distinctions of the two governments’ reliability—perceiving Kampala as consistently reliable but Nairobi as generally disinterested and reluctant to engage. “p. 8

- In public, senior donor officials have consistently described the Museveni regime as ‘a strong ally in the war on terror’ with one senior US Pentagon official in thanking Kampala ‘for [its] support and partnership’ in this endeavour. In his frequent visits to Washington, Museveni has also often been personally lauded by senior policy-makers, including the US president, for his government’s level of cooperation.” P. 9

- Cables from Kampala, however, reveal a different picture. As in their public pronouncements, donor officials privately praised the Museveni regime for ‘cooperating fully in the War on Terror’ and being ‘highly receptive to US training and presence’ (Kampala cable . . . ). Ugandan security officials are also depicted as being far more committed to fighting terrorism—a cable, for example, stressed how ‘Ugandan officials view their role in Somalia as long-term’ (Kampala cable . . . ). Likewise, a cable which highlights several areas for improvement in Uganda’s security structures nevertheless makes clear that ‘Uganda is responsive when terrorist threats are identified’ (Kampala cable . . . ).” P. 11


Abstract: Recent scholarship on Africa has sought to reject the notion that aid dependence precludes the securing of agency by many African states. This article seeks to support and develop this argument through exploring the relationship between aid ‘structures’ and African agency. Contending that structures and agents are mutually-constituted, it is argued that African governments’ interactions with one such structure provide considerable room for agency. The ‘rationale’ upon which donor support for particular regimes is based, for example, can be reshaped and managed by African governments through the latter’s diplomatic efforts. In doing so, these regimes can secure considerable agency in relations with donors by ‘validating’ narratives which encourage continued support and undermining those which do not. To establish this point, the diplomatic activities of four African states—Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda—will be analysed. All four have received donor assistance as a result of their perceived role as regional forces for stability and security. All four have also been faced with scenarios where these rationales have been challenged and undermined by their own policies.
Adams

Annotated Bibliography on Militarization in East African

- Kampala’s persistent failure to defeat the LRA or protect northern Ugandans has generally been interpreted by commentators as a political choice rather than a sad consequence of limited military capacity. The UPDF has long been one of the most disciplined and competent armed forces in East Africa and was fully capable of engaging in a lengthy war in Congo between 1996 and 2003 (see below). Many have therefore suggested that the Museveni regime purposefully prolonged the instability in northern Uganda to ‘punish’ local civilians who largely opposed its armed campaign for power in the 1980s and to occupy UPDF soldiers who might otherwise face demobilization.” P. 548

- “Joseph Kony also became the first individual to be indicted by the ICC in July 2005 and the organisation has therefore been particularly anxious to secure his capture to boost its own credibility. It has, nevertheless, consistently adopted Kampala’s own perspective on the political economy of the northern Ugandan conflict with Ocampo arguing in early 2012 that ‘the criminal here [in northern Uganda] is Kony; stop him and then solve other problems’.” P. 549

- “Thus, immediately following Uganda’s formal withdrawal from Congo in 2003, Museveni and a number of senior Ugandan officials visited London and Washington where they personally impressed upon donor counterparts the extent to which the intervention should be understood as part of Uganda’s continued fight against regional terrorist groups.73 Museveni elaborated on this issue at a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations during his 2003 US trip, telling an audience of policy-makers, journalists and academics that the LRA and Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) ‘have been trained by al-Qaeda and operated [...] out of Congo since the 1990s’. 74 He later repeated this theme, framing Uganda’s involvement in Congo as premised on removing the ‘safe haven’ Kinshasa was providing to ‘terrorists’ on the Ugandan and Rwandan borders.” P. 553


Abstract: The labelling of certain states as ‘fragile states’ has often been portrayed as an act of domination by Western donors over the developing world. Nonetheless, this type of categorisation also presents opportunities to non-Western governments. This article suggests that the aid-dependent government of Uganda has increased its room for manoeuvre with donors by emphasising the degree of instability in the north of the country. By using this notion of state fragility, the Ugandan regime has successfully persuaded donors to continue their support, despite its domestic transgressions. The article will also attempt to explain the regime’s use of a contradictory, but equally persuasive, international discourse that presents Uganda as stable, strong and secure. In exploring how Kampala has successfully employed both narratives to carve out greater agency with donors, the article will emphasise the significance of donors’ physical detachment from the Ugandan ‘periphery’ in this dynamic.

- “The same donors, however, have simultaneously justified their support by referring to the threat posed by rebel groups and the perennial insecurity in the more peripheral
regions of the country. Since the mid-1990s substantial development and security assistance has been provided to the regime (by the USA and the UK in particular) to help arm and train the ‘pitifully underequipped’ Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) in their campaign against the LRA ‘menace’, and more recently to promote disarmament and reconstruction efforts in these conflict-ridden regions. This support has increasingly been discussed, at Kampala’s urging, in the context of global counter-terrorism policy – for example, a US legislator pushed for increased US aid to the Museveni regime in 2005 to help it combat ‘its own home-grown terrorism’ – but it remains linked to the notion that the Ugandan government is still incapable of protecting its citizens from marauding rebels or providing even basic infrastructure in these regions of the country without international assistance.” P. 326

Adam Branch


Abstract: This paper begins by exploring the unique place of Gulu Town within the 20-year civil war in northern Uganda (1986–2006). It describes the conditions faced by the large internally displaced population of Gulu during the war and explains why the town has remained relatively stable despite the massive influx it experienced of uprooted rural Acholi. The paper explores the social changes that have occurred among the displaced population within Gulu’s tenuous urban environment, focusing on the breakdown of male, lineage-based authority and on the impact of town life on women and ex-rebels. Finally, the paper charts the changes in displacement patterns that have occurred in Gulu since the end of the war as a new landless and marginalised population seek haven in town and as social conditions and tensions, instead of improving, worsen with peace.

- “The Ugandan state’s response, however, has been predictable: despite the fact that it foresaw increased unemployment and poverty as far back as 2007 (Republic of Uganda, 2007b, p. 77), the state’s most noticeable interventions have been the politicised distribution of resources and the intimidation of those parts of the population that might protest. Almost every day, fighter jets roar overhead—these are the planes bought by the Ugandan government in 2011 for threequarters of a billion dollars—conducting training exercises, apparently preparing for an unnamed future war.” P. 3165


Abstract: This article shows how international humanitarianism and state violence developed a sustained relation of mutual support during the civil war in northern Uganda. This collaboration was anchored in the archipelago of forced displacement camps, which at the peak of the war contained about a million people, and which were only able to exist because of, first, the violence of the Ugandan state in forcing people into them, preventing people from leaving, and repressing political organisation in the camps; and, second, the intervention of international humanitarian aid agencies, which fed, managed, and sustained the camps for over a decade. The
consequence was that state violence and international humanitarianism each depended on the other for its own viability.

- “However, just as state violence alone could not contain, control, and de-politicise people to the point where they remained in the camps, but depended on humanitarianism to complement its efforts, so humanitarianism could not discipline people to the point where they conformed to that victim identity without the coincidental and complementary exercise of state violence.” P. 478
- “Aid agencies in northern Uganda were not in the position of needing to cut deals with the government to guarantee access to suffering populations. Rather, they found it in their interest to cooperate openly with the government’s counterinsurgency to the point of enabling its policy of mass forced displacement and internment.” P. 478
- “The UPDF drove hundreds of thousands of Acholi peasants out of their villages and into camps through a campaign of murder, intimidation, and the bombing and burning of entire villages. After the formation of the camps, the UPDF announced that anyone found outside of the camps would be considered a rebel and killed. While the government euphemistically calls the camps ‘protected villages’, they are most accurately identified as internment or concentration camps, given their origins in forced displacement and the continued government violence used to keep civilians from leaving.” P. 480
- “In December 2001, Colin Powell announced that the LRA had been placed on the State Department’s Terrorist Exclusion List,26 and soon after that, Uganda and the US began linking their respective wars on terror – the US against global terror, and Uganda against the local terror of the LRA.27 The US has directly funded to the Ugandan military and provided it with military assistance.28 In exchange, Uganda was the only East African country to openly support the US invasion of Iraq and even offered to send troops in the early days of the war.” P. 481-2
- “The role of the security forces, in short, has not been to provide protection to the camps, but to repress those in the camps who would organise to protest their internment or poor conditions. Devoid of protection, the camps have not served a military purpose for the Ugandan government but rather have had the political effect of preventing political organisation among the Acholi that, in the short run, could hold the UPDF accountable or demand the end of the war or, in the long run, could be a base of opposition against the current government.” P. 486
- “The government also uses the presence of relief agencies to provide international legitimacy for its militarisation. Since the government is seen as the only legitimate armed force in the conflict, the aid agencies depend upon, in the words of a World Bank officer, the ‘good graces’ of the UPDF for their protection.” P. 487


Abstract: Given that humanitarian organizations can often be responsible for enabling, prolonging or intensifying violence and conflict through their interventions into war zones, it is important that these organizations, despite their presumed neutrality and beneficence, be held accountable for the deleterious consequences of their actions. The case of northern Uganda will
be used to demonstrate how humanitarian agencies have made possible the government’s counterinsurgency, including its policy of mass forced displacement and internment, which has led to a vast humanitarian crisis. The Ugandan government policy will be assessed as a war crime, making aid agencies accessories to this crime. This case study is used as an example to highlight that processes which demand the post-conflict accountability of those responsible for violence may be dramatically incomplete, and unjust, if they do not include the humanitarian agencies. In conclusion it will be suggested that if humanitarian organizations built popular accountability mechanisms into their daily operations this might prevent them from being complicit with egregious violence in the first place.

- “The government proceeded by ordering Acholi civilians of Gulu district out of their homes and villages and into demarcated areas. A few days after the order (in some places, an even shorter time), the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) began indiscriminately bombing homesteads and villages, burning down homes and granaries, and launching a violent campaign involving arbitrary arrest, torture and murder against those civilians who did not comply.” P. 154

- “More importantly, humanitarian collaboration with internment provides the government with symbolic resources, namely an internationally-grounded humanitarian justification for the militarization of the north and for the orientation of its budget towards counterinsurgency infrastructure. There have been reports that the Ugandan government was to receive additional US military aid to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance to the displaced; there has also been talk of establishing ‘security corridors’ or ‘humanitarian corridors’ to the camps for aid delivery.” P. 161

- “Furthermore, the UPDF itself regularly used violence against the displaced civilians. The camps made the people dependent upon an insufficient Ugandan army presence and easy prey for rebel violence, in contrast to their situation at home, where they retained the freedom to negotiate a difficult path between the two armed parties. Indeed, the fact that people preferred to remain at home and, when interned, tried to leave the camps, was testament to the heightened insecurity they found under displacement.” P. 162

- “As to the military necessity of displacement, there was no clear military imperative for such a policy. Displacement was not followed by a UPDF military offensive, and it is debatable whether the Ugandan government has made any good-faith effort to defeat the rebels militarily since.” P. 163


Abstract: The International Criminal Court’s intervention into the ongoing civil war in northern Uganda evoked a chorus of confident predictions as to its capacity to bring peace and justice to the war-torn region. This optimism is unwarranted, however. The article analyzes the consequences for peace and justice of the ICC’s intervention, dividing them into two categories: those resulting from the political instrumentalization of the ICC by the Ugandan government, and those resulting from the discourse and practice of the ICC as an institution of global law enforcement. As to the first, the article argues that the Ugandan government referred the conflict to the ICC in order to obtain international support for its militarization and to entrench, not resolve, the war; the ICC, in accepting the referral and prosecuting only the Lord’s Resistance
Army, has in effect chosen to pursue a politically pragmatic case even though doing so contravenes the interests of peace, justice, and the rule of law. As to the second, the article reveals the harmful effects that ICC intervention can have on the capacity for autonomous political organization and action among civilian victims of violence, specifically how it leads to depoliticization by promoting a political dependency mediated by international law. The article draws from this analysis disturbing implications about ICC interventions generally, and concludes by asking whether ICC practice may be reformed so as to avoid these negative consequences.

- “Indeed, since 1986 the government has vigorously promoted a military approach to the northern crisis, and so the ICC intervention, by providing international legitimation for the military campaign in the name of enforcing international law, has cleared the way for the government’s militarism. The effects of this have already begun to be apparent: simultaneous with the announcement of the appointment of the investigation’s prosecutor, the UPDF announced that it would reenter Sudan to hunt down the LRA leadership.23 Museveni has also attempted to use the arrest warrants—thus far unsuccessfully—to justify the UPDF’s reentry into eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where their prior intervention led to massive looting and atrocities against Congolese civilians.” P. 184

- “On the international level, the continuation of the war has provided the means for Museveni to reinvent himself, especially in the wake of 9/11, as the key U.S. ally in the region. Museveni has been the recipient of significant American military aid and diplomatic support for his own ‘war on terror’ against the LRA in exchange for serving as a conduit for support and resources to the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in southern Sudan, the front line in the American war on terror against the Khartoum government (and now for its support in Somalia).” P. 185


Abstract: Protection has risen to prominence over the past decade in fields from humanitarian practice to military operations. Its rise, however, has been characterized by a lack of clarity over what it means in practice. This article attempts to discern the politics of protection by examining a specific case: the international effort to protect civilians from the Lord’s Resistance Army. It argues that the initiatives being mounted to protect civilians from the Lord’s Resistance Army should be seen as efforts to constitute and experiment with new forms of transnational political authority, specifically unaccountable, militarized administration networks that bring together state, international, and substate actors and institutions.

- “Operation Lightning Thunder (OLT) was the first major result of the renewed military approach. Starting on December 14, 2008, the Ugandan military (UPDF) launched what was supposed to be a surprise air and ground attack on LRA bases in DRC. In practice, the operation was a disaster: the LRA had cleared out of its bases before the attack and then staged an ambush on the UPDF when they finally arrived.17 Predictably, the failed strike precipitated a wave of LRA violence, as the group killed over a thousand civilians in DRC and South Sudan in the following weeks.18 The regional militaries and police
forces were unprepared or unwilling to protect civilians, and LRA violence led to a new round of widespread displacement.” P. 168
- “Uganda, in particular, is able to extend its role as a regional military power and build goodwill with the West, useful to compensate for the blows its reputation has suffered due to its internal repression of democracy and dissent. Uganda can militarize further, of key importance to a regime that depends more and more heavily on the military for its survival. The DRC is the only state that has expressed occasional opposition to the expanded presence of foreign militaries on its soil but not to the point where the operations have been threatened.” P. 173

Ledio Cakaj


Abstract: In October 2011 the US announced the deployment of 100 special force troops to assist the Ugandan army against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). For several years the originally northern Ugandan rebel group has been active in neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic and South Sudan. The announcement generated mixed responses, but has generally triggered a strong upsurge in support for an international military approach to deal with the LRA, almost invariably accompanied by a call for enhanced civilian protection. Among the strongest supporters of the deployment, and the military approach that this embodies, have been humanitarian groups who have advocated such a policy in the name of the humanitarian use of force. The present article points out that the promotion of this approach has occurred without a careful assessment of the military requirements necessary for its success, even against a weakened LRA. The article provides this military assessment and concludes, after examining the many challenges and limitations confronting the anti-LRA forces, that the necessary requirements for success are highly unlikely to be met. Given that unsuccessful military operations against the rebels have typically resulted in LRA retaliation against civilians, the paper urges caution in pursuing such options and awareness of likely civilian consequences. First, do no harm.

- No good notes/word bits